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Abstract 
In his assessment of the theory development within international market entry 
mode, Cumberland (2006) outlines the importance of devoting more attention to 
the research linking the theoretical level and the operational level. Other 
researchers have shown the performance of a firm is highly affected by its 
internationalisation process and selecting the right entry mode is one of the most 
critical managerial decisions. Despite many years of interest from researchers, 
the entry choice strategy area is still considered a frontier issue.  
 
Researchers have suggested that managing risk is one of the major strategic 
objectives for managers of multinational firms. Furthermore, risk is regarded as 
a key determinant in relation to entry mode choice. Research has found that the 
various risk variables should be regarded as an integrated measure in relation to 
entry mode choice and not single measures. By looking at a single risk variable, 
the firm might analyse the situation incorrectly, which may lead to an incorrect 
entry mode.  
 
This study investigates the relationship between entry mode choice, perceived 
risk and risk tolerance for Danish firms entering Central and Eastern Europe by 
using a probabilistic model. The results indicate risk should be regarded as an 
integrated measure in relation to entry mode. Despite not all risk variables 
showing significant correlation with entry mode, some relations were found. The 
preferred model for predicting entry mode included years of CEE experience, 
number of competitors, cultural difference, consumer taste and future market 
potential. In addition, the analysis showed that Danish firms generally are 
relatively risk averse. Regardless of entry mode, the analysis showed that Danish 
firms regard CEE as politically stable and do not see a potential risk in 
government involvement in their activities. Furthermore, Danish firms 
experience relatively high and increasing competition in CEE, however, they 
indicate the same methods are available for marketing in CEE as in Denmark.  
 
Keywords  
Entry mode, risk, perceived risk, risk tolerance, Danish firms, Central and 
Eastern Europe.   
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1. Introduction 
The performance of a firm is highly affected by its internationalisation process 
(Brouthers et al. 2000, Buhner 1987, Daniels and Bracker 1989, Geringer et al. 
1988, Hitt et al. 1991, Morrison and Roth 1992a, 1992b). This is because doing 
business in foreign countries is deemed to be substantially more risky than 
remaining in the domestic market (Brouthers et al. 2000, Ghoshal 1987, Vernon 
1985).  
 
Selecting the right entry mode for an international market is one of the most 
critical managerial decisions and affects the long-term success of a firm (Bradley 
and Gannon 2000, Brouthers et al. 1996, Lu and Beamish 2001, Luostarinen and 
Welch 1997). Despite many years of interest from researchers and the 
international commercial environment, the entry choice strategy area is still 
considered a frontier issue within the field of international marketing 
(Cumberland 2006).  
 
Brouthers (1995) has suggested that managing risk is one of the major strategic 
objectives for managers of multinational firms (Ghoshal 1987). Further, Yasai-
Ardekani (1986) has suggested that risk has an influence on management 
perception (Brouthers 1995). This influence then affects the structure and 
management of the firm. To outline the importance, it has been found that firms 
choosing a strategy which incorporates international risk perform better than 
firms that do not take risk into consideration (Kwon and Konopa 1993, Miller 
and Bromiley 1990, Miller and Reuer 1998).  
 
Research has shown a relationship between risk and international expansion – 
meaning that firms can reduce overall risk by entering new markets and 
spreading out their activities (Brouthers 1995, Rugman 1979). Further, research 
has shown that risk can be a motivation for international expansion, especially in 
the form of bargaining power when entering a competitor’s market (Brouthers 
1995, Casson 1987, Graham 1985, Vernon 1974, Vernon 1985).  
 
For several researchers, risk is and has been regarded as a key determinant in 
relation to entry mode (Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Brouthers 1995, Buckley 
and Mathew 1980, Contractor 1990, Hennart 1988, Root 1987). Previous 
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research has shown that international risk perceptions have a significant impact 
on the entry mode choice (Brouthers 1995, Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992). 
Vernon (1985), Miller (1992), Brouthers (1995) and Ahmed et al. (2002) have 
suggested that the perception of integrated international risk and the strategic 
choice of entry mode may be related. Their research has suggested the 
shortcoming of only looking at one or two risk variables – e.g. ownership risk or 
transfer risk – contrary to the integrated risk. By only looking at a single risk 
variable, the firm might analyse the situation incorrectly, which may lead to an 
incorrect entry mode.  
 
Based on the research of Vernon (1985), Miller (1992), Brouthers (1995), 
Brouthers et al. (2008) and Ahmed et al. (2002), this study will adapt a model 
for measuring perceived risk in relation to entry mode strategies of Danish firms 
in Central and Eastern Europe. The purpose is to validate the model on Danish 
firms.  
 
This leads to the two main hypotheses: In countries where risk is low, firms will 
select entry strategies in which they can maintain control over the operation 
and in countries where risk is high, firms will select entry strategies which shift 
risks and control to other firms.  
 
Chapter 2 below contains a literature review of previous literature on entry 
mode, risk, Central and Eastern Europe and risk tolerance. In chapter 3 the 
method is described with focus on measurements, survey & data and analytical 
methodology. In chapter 4 the analysis and results are presented. Chapter 5 
contains a discussion of the results. Finally, the thesis is rounded off in the 
conclusion in chapter 6.  
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2. Literature review 
Since the first two countries started trading with each other scholars have been 
trying to explain who was gaining from what. For years most theories describing 
cross-border interactions focused on the nations involved, but as the world and 
its inhabitants have become more and more global the focus has also been on the 
individual firm. There is a large amount of literature describing the methods that 
firms use when they engage in cross-border interactions. A lot of this entry-mode 
literature considers the firm and host country to develop explanation for the 
specific entry mode that firms choose.  
 
There are several issues that are central to the literature of entry modes. Of the 
most important the following two can be mentioned. First is the importance of 
the entry-mode decision to the future success of the entry. Some literature 
describes the entry mode decision as one of the most critical ones a firm can 
undertake. Second are the various entry modes a firm can choose. The key in the 
literature is the resource allocation and desire for control that the firm wish to 
have over its foreign operation.  
 
2.1 Entry mode 
The strategic choice of market entry mode is one of the most critical decisions a 
firm can undertake when it decides to enter a new international market. This 
decision establishes the framework for future international entry structures and 
the level of control the firm will have over their operations abroad (Choo and 
Mazzarol 2001, Stern and El-Ansary 1982). 
 
Beginning with Hymer’s (1976) work, researchers have been using different 
theories of the firm to explain its entry mode choices. Included in this work have 
been at least six major entry mode choice theories, originating from three 
different theoretical frameworks of the firm that have been proposed over the 
last four decades (Sharma and Erramilli 2004).  
 
The market imperfection framework was the dominant theory during the 1960s 
and 1970s, the behavioural framework during the 1970s and part of the 1980s, 
and the market failure from the 1980s and onward (Sharma and Erramilli 
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2004).1 All three frameworks were founded in the market-based view of the firm 
– an outside-in view from the product side of the firm (Conner 1991, Sharma and 
Erramilli 2004). During the early 1990s the resource-based view of the firm was 
introduced. The resource-based view describes the firm from the perspective of 
its resources endowment and deployment – an inside-out view of the firm rather 
than an outside-in view (Sharma and Erramilli 2004).  
 
Foreign market entry mode can be defined as “an institutional arrangement that 
makes possible the entry of a company’s products, technology, human skills, 
management, or other resources into a foreign country” (Root 1987, p. 5). This  
definition by Root (1987) covers the host country production and marketing 
modes as well as the export modes including the export, contractual and foreign 
investment modes, and is regarded as the foundation of entry mode definitions 
(Sharma and Erramilli 2004). Later definitions have been developed around it 
(Sharma and Erramilli 2004).  
 
Anderson and Gatignon (1986) and Gatignon and Anderson (1988) refer to an 
entry mode as a governance structure that allows a firm to exercise control over 
its foreign operations (Sharma and Erramilli 2004). This definition refers to the 
country production and marketing modes in relation to the level of control - 
contracts, joint venture, and wholly owned subsidiary (Sharma and Erramilli 
2004). Anderson and Coughlan (1987) arranged the export modes along the 
same dimension (Sharma and Erramilli 2004). Finally, Hill et al.’s (1990 p. 119) 
definition – “an entry mode as a way of organising a firm’s business activities in 
a foreign country” – also relates to the existing ones.  
 
It is important at the outset to define the terminology that will be used to 
describe the various entry modes. This thesis distinguishes between three 
general types of entry modes:  
 
                                                        
1 Due to the limitations of this thesis, the description of these various entry mode theories will 
not be covered in detail. Such a description can be found in Sharma and Erramilli (2004) pp. 2-
6. In short, these six key entry mode choice theories are: Hymer’s, International product life 
cycle, Internationalization, Internalization, Eclectic and the Transaction cost theory. Hymer’s 
theory and the international product life cycle theory are grounded the market imperfection 
framework. The internationalization theories are grounded in the behavior framework. And the 
last three theories have their foundation in the market failure framework (Sharma and Erramilli 
2004).   
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• Exporting (non-equity mode). Includes two types of entry: (1) Exporting: 
Involves a firm selling its products which are manufactured outside the 
host country to the host country. (2): Licensing/franchising 
(agent/distributor). Types of contractual agreements (Root 1994, Shane 
1994), involving non-equity associations between an international firm 
and a party in the host country in which technology or management 
systems are transferred (Taylor et al. 1998).  
 
• Joint venture. A joint venture requires the firm to enter into an 
arrangement where equity and control of the venture are shared with a 
partner from the host country. An equity investment is required in the 
joint venture, and can involve taking a minority or a majority stake in the 
venture (Makino and Beamish 1998, Pan and Tse 1996, Tse et al. 1997).  
 
• Wholly owned subsidiary. Here the parent firm owns a subsidiary 100 
percent in the host country. Full ownership can involve either acquiring an 
existing business in the host country or investing in new facilities 
(Greenfield investment) (Taylor et al. 1998).  
 
This classification is widely used by other researchers in the area of entry mode 
strategy (Ahmed et al. 2002, Brouthers et al. 1993, Brouthers 1995, Buckley and 
Casson 1981, Contractor 1984, Czinkota et al. 1994, Erramilli and Rao 1990, Hill 
and Kim 1988, Hill et al. 1990, Hirsch 1976, Kim and Hwang 1992, Minor et al. 
1991, Mirus 1980, Naumann and Lincoln 1991, Rugman 1981, Teece 1983, 1985, 
1986, Young et al. 1989 – see e.g. Caves 1982 and Root 1987 for an extensive 
discussion).  
 
In the context of foreign market entry, it has been found that the choice of entry 
mode strategy is a trade-off between preferences for control and resource 
commitment (Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992, 
Erramilli and Rao 1990, Hill et al. 1990, and Hwang 1992, Kogut and Singh 
1988). This trade-off can only be evaluated in the context of the risk that 
management thinks it may encounter in the host country (Brouthers 1995). In 
high risk countries, firms may not be willing to commit resources. In countries 
that firms perceive as low risk, they may desire control over the operation, 
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assuming that they (or a potential partner) can do as good a job of running the 
foreign operation as they do with the domestic operation.  
 
Each of the entry modes described above is consistent with a different level of 
control (Calvet 1984, Root 1987) and resource commitment (Vernon 1979). By 
control is meant the authority over operational and strategic decision making, 
while resource commitment refers to dedicated assets that cannot be redeployed 
to alternative uses without loss of value (Kim and Hwang 1992).  
 
2.1.1 Exporting (non-equity)  
Exporting is the mode of entry that requires the least commitment of resources 
on the part of the firm in relation to the internationalisation process. However, 
exporting only gives very limited control possibilities for the entering firm. With 
export entry modes, a firm’s products are manufactured in the domestic market 
or a third country, and then transferred either directly or indirectly to the host 
market. Direct export normally involves the firm handling all paper work, 
physical delivery and set the prices, for example, with the product either being 
sold directly to the customer or through agents or distributors. Indirect export 
modes, by contrast, generally involve the use of intermediaries – such as trading 
firms to perform these activities, often without the firm’s involvement in the 
foreign sales of their products (Driscoll and Paliwoda 1997).  
 
Contractual entry modes include a number of arrangements – such as licensing, 
franchising, management and turnkey contracts, non-equity joint ventures and 
technical, know-how or coproduction arrangements. Contractual arrangements 
generally take place when firms having some sort of competitive advantage are 
unable to exploit this advantages because of for example constraints in 
resources, but are able to transfer the advantage to another party who has the 
resources. These arrangements often entail long term relationships between 
partner firms and are typically designed to transfer intermediate goods – such as 
knowledge and/or skills between firms in different markets (Driscoll and 
Paliwoda 1997).  
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2.1.2 Joint venture (equity) 
Joint venture is defined as the pooling of assets of two or more firms in a 
common and separate organisation. Joint ventures may at times be the only 
entry mode allowed by the host government, but in many instances they are also 
preferred entry modes as they allow a firm to limit initial resource commitment, 
and later expand or terminate the investment depending on the joint venture’s 
performance or some other strategic considerations (Madhok 1997).  
 
Joint ventures can be established by setting up a new operation, similar to 
greenfield investments, or by using a partner’s existing assets, similar to a partial 
acquisition. In this thesis, there will not be distinguished between these two 
different types of joint venture, since focus is on resource commitment and 
control in relation to the entry mode, which is the same in both types.  
 
Joint ventures require fewer resources on the part of the firm compared to 
wholly owned subsidiaries, but they also reduce the control that management has 
over the foreign operation. In joint ventures the levels of control and resource 
commitment can vary with the nature of the ownership split, however the extent 
of control and resource commitment generally lies between that of wholly owned 
subsidiaries and exporting.  
 
For firms seeking to enter a foreign market, a critical issue is whether they can 
apply their competitive advantages to those markets. Their success in a foreign 
market depends heavily on their ability to transfer their know-how to the local 
partner, as well as on the ability of the local partner to absorb that know-how 
(Madhok 1997). Not all potential foreign market entrants possess sufficient 
knowledge of the local market to earn acceptable returns on their resources, nor 
are they able to develop that knowledge in a timely or cost-effective manner 
(Madhok 1997). However, by cooperating with a local partner, a firm entering a 
foreign market can fill gaps in its knowledge base (Aulakh and Kotabe 1997, 
Burgel and Murray 2000, Erramilli and Rao 1990, Luo 2001). By cooperating 
with entrants, the local partner can gain access to the entrant’s know-how. This 
mutual association enables both firms to increase the likelihood of earning 
greater returns on their investments.  
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The entrant will realise greater returns from such cooperations to the extent that 
its know-how can be readily transferred to the local partner and the local partner 
can absorb that know-how (Madhok 1997). Without these conditions, the entrant 
will attempt to wield more control in the foreign market. Greater returns can be 
jeopardised if dealing with the local partner raises transaction costs – the costs 
of designing, negotiating, executing, and monitoring exchange transactions (Hill 
et al. 1990, Erramilli and Rao 1993, Teece 1980). Essentially, transaction costs 
are higher when the value of the firm’s resources is at risk. This can happen 
when the entrant has little experience or knowledge with the foreign market or 
their local partner (Kim and Hwang 1992). The more these conditions exits, the 
more vulnerable the entrant is to local partner opportunism, hence the more 
likely it is that the entrant will use control to protect itself in the foreign market 
(Andersen 1997, Hill et al. 1990).  
 
The success of a joint venture depends on partner performance and cooperation. 
Partner cooperation, however, should not be assumed to exist in all joint 
ventures. Quite often, joint venture partners fight, as each of them attempts to 
get ahead in a manner that hurts the other partner firm (Hamel et al. 1989, Paik 
2005). Joint ventures involve both explicit costs such as the cost of shared 
operations and implicit costs for negotiating, monitoring, and controlling 
exchange transactions (Brockhoff 1992, Paik 2005, Williamson 1989). Regardless 
of its own hidden agenda in a joint venture, a firm will be concerned about its 
partner firm’s opportunistic behaviour (Das and Teng 1998, Paik 2005).  
 
In terms of control, joint ventures are often regarded by firms as the second-best 
mode of entry because joint ventures provide only a limited degree of control 
over the local firm and reduce the entering firm’s flexibility to change the 
operation. Therefore, joint ventures are in most cases only used if the following 
specific conditions are present: (1) the operation depends on resources from two 
or more partners; (2) the markets for the resources from the partners are subject 
to market failure, i.e. high transaction costs; and (3) it is not feasible to 
internalise the whole operation with one partner taking over the other(s) 
(Buckley and Casson 1976, 1998, Hennart 1988, Meyer and Nguyen 2005). The 
first two conditions are for entering firms to seek collaboration with a local 
partner rather than establish a greenfield operation. The third condition 
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distinguishes acquisition from a joint venture entry (Anderson and Gatignon 
1986, Buckley and Casson 1976, Hennart 1988 and 1991, Meyer and Nguyen 
2005).  
 
2.1.3 Wholly owned subsidiaries 
Wholly owned subsidiaries require large resource commitments and will give the 
entering firm full control of the international operation. This full control may be 
achieved either through greenfield investments, which means setting up a new 
plant or other establishments from scratch, or through acquisition, which means 
the purchase of a controlling interest in a local firm – if there is partial control 
with a local firm if falls under the category joint venture.  
 
This complete ownership gives the firm the ability to manage the daily activities 
of the operation without the interference or consent of other parties. 
Acquisitions offer the fastest means of building a sizable presence in a foreign 
market, yet are fraught with risks of overpayment, inability to fully assess the 
value of acquired assets, and post-acquisition challenges including cross-cultural 
integration. Greenfield investments offer the greatest control over the local 
affiliate, yet often require the greatest contribution of know-how (Datta and Puia 
1995).  
 
A wholly owned subsidiary is the preferred entry mode for firms that want 
complete control of their operations in new and emerging markets. As the firm 
has control over all issues in the operation, cooperation with a partner firm is no 
longer an issue as compared to a joint venture. Many firms use wholly owned 
subsidiaries as an entry mode into new markets because they provide them with 
the greatest degree of control while eliminating many of the performance and 
relational risk traditionally associated with joint ventures (Amin et al. 1995, Paik 
2005).  
 
One key difference between joint ventures and greenfield wholly owned 
subsidiaries investments is the origin of the resources employed in the new firm. 
A Greenfield wholly owned subsidiary uses the resources of the entering firm and 
combines them with local assets, giving the entering firm more control over the 
organisation of the new firm. A joint venture provides access to selected 
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resources contributed by the local partner. At the same time, control over the 
firm has to be shared with the local partner firm (Anand and Delios 2002, 
Hennart and Park 1993, Meyer and Estrin 2001, Meyer and Nguyen 2005). 
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2.2 Risk 
In most cases the driver behind international expansion is the fruitfulness of new 
markets, however most firms face many and varied risks in these markets 
(Ahmed et al. 2002, Brouthers 1995). Risk can be defined as “(1) the uncertainty 
associated with exposure to a loss caused by some unpredictable events and (2) 
variability in the possible outcome of an event based on chance” (Ahmed et al. 
2002, p. 805). The amount of risk related to a chance event depends on how 
accurately the results can be predicted – the more accurate the prediction, the 
lower the degree of risk (Ahmed et al. 2002, Jackson and Musselman 1987).  
 
Miller (1992) states that business and strategy literature lacks a generally 
accepted definition of international risk. Risk is in most cases related to 
unanticipated or negative variation in revenue, cost, profit, or market share, and 
Ahmed et al. (2002, p. 805) therefore defines international risk as “as the 
dangers firms faced in terms of limitations, restrictions, or even losses when 
engaging in international business”.  
 
Firms normally find foreign business opportunities to involve more risk than 
domestic ones (Ghoshal 1987, Miller and Bromiley 1990, Vernon 1985). In 
foreign markets firms all too often encounter new types of risk and by doing so, 
incur costs they would normally avoid in the domestic market (Werner et al. 
1996). These costs could include insurance premiums to protect property from 
nationalisation (Howell and Chaddick 1994) or costs for physical security 
measures to protect property and people against kidnapping, sabotage or 
terrorism (Harvey 1993). International risk may also affect performance through 
losses due to government actions (Makhija 1993). These governmental actions 
include expropriation of firm assets or new policies that restricts the actions of 
the firm – such as cross-border trade restrictions (Mason 1994, Minor 1994). The 
most common risk firms face on the foreign markets is the exchange-rate risk, 
which can create losses in otherwise profitable operations when a currency is 
devalued (Luehrman 1990).  
 
The international business literature has tended to focus on particular types of 
risk – especially political risk, ownership risk, or transfer risk (Agarwal and 
Ramaswami 1992, Akhter and Lusch 1998, Bonaccorsi 1992, Campa 1994, Howell 
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and Chaddick 1994, Kim and Hwang 1992, Luuehrman 1990, Ting 1988) contrary 
to interrelated risks (Miller 1992). This has been regarded as a significant 
shortcoming in the literature. Examining only one international risk variable, 
such as political risk or financial risk, might lead to incorrect entry mode 
decisions because other related risks were ignored (Brouthers 1995, Miller 1992). 
Research has suggested that actions taken to avoid one type of risk may actually 
increase exposure to other types of risk (Brouthers 1995, Miller 1992). Since all 
forms of risk may not be related to each other, a single international measure of 
risk may not be appropriate. For these reasons, it appears to be important to 
incorporate a number of international risk factors into investigation of 
international risk.  
 
Vernon (1985) was the first to refer to international risk, however it was Miller 
(1992) who provided details of a threefold integration of international risk 
variables – (1) general environment uncertainty, (2) industry risk, and (3) firm-
specific risk.2  
 
General environment uncertainty refers to those variables that are related to all 
industries within a country – such as political risk, government policy 
uncertainties, economic uncertainties, social uncertainties, and natural 
uncertainties (e.g. natural disasters). Industry risk refers to the risks related to 
difference in industrial or product-specific factors. Among these factors are 
uncertainties related to production inputs – such as the availability of material 
and labour supply, quality, and quantity. These uncertainties can be created by 
changes in supply or changes in demand within a specific country. Product 
market uncertainties are also included in the area of industry risk, and these can 
be consumer tastes, and the availability of substitute or complementary goods. 
These uncertainties would have an impact on the demand for an industry’s 
output (Ahmed et al. 2002, Brouthers 1995, Miller 1992).  
 
Furthermore, there are the uncertainties that refer to the competitive 
uncertainty of an industry. This is a wide group of uncertainties which 
encompasses the firm’s ability to predict the amount and type of goods available 
                                                        
2 Shan (1991) made a study that attempted to examine the influence of two types of risk which 
were labeled as “contextual” and “transactional” risk. However, there was no attempt by Shan to 
directly measure them.  
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in the market. Competitive uncertainties come from competition among existing 
firms, entrance of new firms, and changes in technology (Brouthers 1995). In 
Brouthers (1995), Miller (1992) states that on an international basis, industry 
risk is closely related to general environment uncertainties, because changes in 
the environmental variables (e.g. trade laws), directly affect the industry 
uncertainties (e.g. availability of inputs and entrance of new competitors) 
(Brouthers 1995).  
 
The third factor in Miller’s (1992) integration of international risk variables is 
firm-specific risk. As stated on in Brouthers (1995, p. 9), this factor includes five 
specific types of uncertainty: “(1) operating uncertainties related to labour unrest 
and employee safety issues, (2) liability uncertainties associated with the 
harmful effects of the product or process to users and nonusers – e.g. pollution, 
(3) credit uncertainties arising from inability to collect accounts receivables, (4) 
behavioural uncertainty where employees and managers may act out of their own 
individual self-interests, and (5) research and development (R&D) uncertainty – 
which is related to the unknown outcome of R&D investments”. These 
uncertainties reduce the predictability of corporate performance, and therefore 
increase international risk (Ahmed et al. 2002, Brouthers 1995).  
 
Further Brouthers (1995, p. 9) states that “the firm-specific risks exist in the 
domestic market as well as internationally, however the nature of international 
operations increases these risks in two ways; (1) because the firm must perform 
these functions in different cultures where the relationships may vary 
significantly from the home market, and (2) international operations are by their 
nature more difficult to structure and control” (Brouthers 1995).  
 
Brouthers (1995) found that both international and domestic firms face many of 
the same risks. However for the international firm, some of these risks are higher 
than for the domestic firm. E.g. the general environmental uncertainty of 
nationalisation, import restrictions, and restrictions on the repatriation of 
profits has a much greater impact on international firms than on domestic firms. 
Industry risk such as import restrictions, access to government owned resources 
or contracts, and competitive uncertainties due to government support for 
certain industries or firms also impact international firms greater than domestic 
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firms (Brouthers 1995). Finally, in the area of firm-specific uncertainties 
international firms face greater operating risk and behavioural uncertainty due 
to the very nature of being nondomestic – e.g. making a potential target for anti-
foreigner sentiment (Brouthers 1995). This was the case with Danish firms in the 
Middle East in early 2007 after the Cartoon issue, where Danish products where 
boycotted due to a political and religious case.  
 
The original part of Vernon (1985) and Miller’s (1992) work was the concept of 
looking at international risk variables as a whole. Decisions in one risk area 
affect the total risk and affect the decisions in other risk areas, therefore, risk is 
multidimensional (Miller 1992).  This multidimensionality can be related to the 
choice of entry mode. Miller (1992) argues that focussing on one specific area of 
risk – such as exchange rate risk or political risk, in isolation of the other risk 
factors could lead to a wrong entry mode choice. Brouthers (1995) took the work 
of Miller (1992) a step further and examined the relationship between 
international risk and entry mode strategy, and found that the choice of entry 
mode varied according to perceptions of international risk (Brouthers 1995).   
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2.3 Risk-entry mode framework 
Empirical studies have found a significant relationship between one or more risk 
factors and entry mode strategy (Kim and Hwang 1992). In these studies, risk 
has been defined as either dissemination risk (Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992, 
Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Brouthers et al. 1993, Kim and Hwang 1992) or as 
country-specific risk (Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Brouthers et al. 1993, 
Erramilli and Rao 1990, Kogut and Singh 1988).  
 
Dissemination risk (part of Miller’s (1992) firm-specific risk) is the risk of 
exposing a firm’s know-how, skills or technology to actual or potential 
competitors (Brouthers 1995 p. 35). Dissemination risk has been operationalised 
in various ways – such as R&D expenses (Chu and Anderson 1992, Gatignon and 
Anderson 1988, Gomes-Casseres 1990, Kim and Hwang 1992, Stopford and Wells 
1972), the number of employees in R&D (Kim and Hwang 1992), marketing and 
advertising expenses (Chu and Anderson 1992, Gatignon and Anderson 1988, 
Gomes-Casseres 1990, Stopford and Wells 1972), monitoring contract 
compliance (Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992), and brand and reputation strength 
(Kim and Hwang 1992). In most cases, higher investments in these variables 
indicate increased dissemination risk. The finding in abovementioned research 
does not, however, indicate how to handle multiple types of risk in entry mode 
decisions (Ahmed et al. 2002).  
 
Country-specific risk (part of Miller’s (1992) general environmental uncertainty) 
is defined as “the external uncertainties (environmental unpredictability) in a 
given country” (Brouthers 1995 p. 35, Gatignon and Anderson 1988). Brouthers 
(1995, p. 12) found that “country-specific risk has been operationalised as 
environmental volatility (Erramilli and Rao 1993), socio-cultural distance (Chu 
and Anderson 1992, Gatignon and Anderson 1988, Kogut and Singh 1988), 
clusters of countries (Anderson and Coughlan 1987, Chu and Anderson 1992, 
Gatignon and Anderson 1988, Goodnow and Hansz 1972), and instability of 
political, social, and economic conditions (Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992, Kim 
and Hwang 1992)”. Most previous entry mode research has addressed these 
elements of international risk separately, but as mentioned above, few studies 
have examined international risk as a whole (Brouthers 1995).  
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As summarized by Brouthers (1995, p. 13), “studies that look at only one variable 
of international risk – such as studies of political risk (Robock 1971, Simon 1982) 
or financial risk (Stone 1989), may lead to incorrect entry mode decisions 
because other related risks – such as social or input market uncertainties, have 
been ignored”. Few studies have incorporated risk as an accumulated measure. 
In relation to entry mode, most studies have analysed a specific aspect of entry 
strategies, especially ownership and control (Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992, 
Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Hill et al. 1990). Neither have they examined the 
trade-off between the different kinds of risk in making the strategic decision, and 
thus provide an incomplete picture. As presented above, different types of risk 
should affect the entry mode strategy in different ways. If only one or two 
variables of risk are considered, the entry mode selected may create unforeseen 
problems for the firm from the risk variables not considered in the entry mode 
selection decision (Brouthers 1995). 
 
Dealing with international risk can happen in various ways – e.g. through the 
choice of appropriate strategies (e.g. entry modes), however, perception of these 
risks may vary from firm to firm and from country to country. If the perception 
of risk varies, so will strategic choice – in this case entry mode (Brouthers 1995).  
Two firms may perceive the same risk in a country but choose different strategies 
because of each firm’s different tolerances of risk (Shama 1995). International 
firms most often seek to minimize risks associated with international expansion 
by controlling the operations of the international set-up, in the belief that this 
will permit them to manage and reduce risks (Ahmed et al. 2002, Brouthers 
1995, Cyert and March 1992). Perceived risk declines over time. The longer a 
firm has been active on a market the more information it has gathered and the 
lower the perceived risk. Companies will change their entry modes towards 
wholly-owned subsidiaries the longer they have been on a market on the 
assumption that a sufficient market potential is present (Shama 1995).  
 
The risk-entry mode framework described below, was first designed by Brouthers 
(1995) and later described by Ahmed et al. (2002). It is based on Miller’s (1992) 
International Risk Framework, and has been extended to include recent entry 
mode selection research. The framework can be divided into two main areas; (1) 
control risks, and (2) market complexity risks. 
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2.3.1 Control risks 
By controlling the international operations, firms seek to minimize risks 
associated with international expansion in the belief, that this will permit them 
to manage and reduce risks (Cyert and March 1992, Mascarenhas 1982). 
However, when the perception of risk is too high, management might no longer 
believe that it has control over the risk. At this point, the strategy must change 
and the firm will be anxious to relieve itself of some of the control, sharing 
responsibility and shifting the risk management to another firm – such as a joint 
venture partner or licensee, which might be better qualified to perform the tasks. 
These control risks are not usually so classifiable into black and white issues. 
When the risk/control trade-off becomes blurred, a strategy of reduced control 
might be appropriate (Ahmed et al. 2002, Brouthers 1995).  
 
2.3.1.1 Management experience 
The Scandinavian model or Uppsala internationalisation model was the first to 
suggest that the choice of entry mode on an international market depends on a 
firm’s international management experience (Johanson and Vahlne 1977, 
Johanson and Weidersheim-Paul 1975). The model explains international 
expansion as a process of knowledge development and incremental commitment. 
The basic assumption of the model is that lack of knowledge – resulting from 
differences in such areas as language and culture – is an important obstacle to 
effective decision-making in international operations (Li 1995). The argument is 
that the necessary knowledge can only be gained through experience abroad. A 
higher level of knowledge can therefore lead to effective strategic choices as part 
of an ongoing, dynamic process of knowledge improvement in firm performance 
(Johanson and Vahlne 1977, Li 1995, Terpstra and Yu 1988, Yu 1990). 
 
The model presents internationalisation as a stepwise progressive model where a 
firm starts with exporting activities in the host market and as it over time gets 
more experienced, it starts using distributors and agents, establish a sales office 
and finally starts its own production in the host country.  
 
The in-experienced firm may make inappropriate decisions about matters such 
as the location, adaption of services and products to local requirements, 
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management of the workforce, and customers or banking relationships. 
Consequently, firms initially begin the international expansion through low 
resource commitments. As they increase their international involvement, they 
acquire knowledge of the foreign markets and become more confident about 
taking part in high-control and resource commitment modes.  
 
This stepwise model has been questioned in many studies relating to 
international market entry (Bell 1995, Crick and Spence 2005, Jones 1999, Moen 
et al. 2004). But a positive relationship between international experience and the 
use of full-control entry modes is well documented in the literature (Chang and 
Rosenzweig 2001, Madhok 1998, Sanchez-Peinado et al. 2007). Prior research 
have identified international experience as a measure of a firm’s ability to 
exercise control and manage an international operation, thus, influencing entry 
mode choice (Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Brouthers 1995, Vernon 1985). A 
lack of experience can have a great impact on risk perception and the desire for 
control (Brouthers 1995, Vernon 1985).  
 
Low levels of experience means that management will perceive high levels of 
international risk (Brouthers 1995, Cavusgil and Naor 1987, Vernon 1985), and 
will have less confidence in its abilities to control foreign operations (Brouthers 
1995). Therefore, management will select an entry mode strategy with a low 
element of control (Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Brouthers 1995). Miller (1992) 
did not include management experience in this framework, but Brouthers (1995) 
and Ahmed et al. (2002) include it in their studies, and additional research 
indicates that management experience has a direct impact on risk perceptions, so 
it is included as part of the theoretical framework for this study.  
 
2.3.1.2 Cultural difference 
Cultural difference refers to the difference or similarities between the cultures of 
the consumers in the home market and those of the host market – e.g. socio-
cultural distance/market knowledge (Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Brouthers 
1995, Kogut and Singh 1988, Erramilli and Rao 1990). Culture affects the 
attitudes and beliefs of potential customers and might impact their responses to 
certain products or services. Violating a cultural norm can be disastrous for a 
firm – a lesson many firms have learn the hard way. With small differences in 
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culture, similar strategies can be adopted. However, as cultural difference 
increases, or market knowledge decrease, a firm’s desire for control decreases 
(Ahmed et al. 2002, Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Erramilli and Rao 1990, 
Kogut and Singh 1988).  
 
Johanson and Vahlne (1977) found that perceptions of significant cultural 
difference between the home and host country support the use of entry modes 
that involve smaller resource commitment. Establishing an operation in an 
environment with a culture different and unfamiliar to the foreign firm increases 
the difficulty of arriving at a judgment about how staff should behave, how to 
quantify the necessary inputs, and what results to expect (Sanchez-Peinado et al. 
2007). In highly different cultures, firms will perceive increased levels of control 
risk because of their lack of market knowledge and will select entry modes 
strategies that minimize management control.  
 
2.3.1.3 Industry structure 
Industry structure is the third component of control risk. Industry structure 
affects perceived risk and entry mode selection as it can create barriers to new 
entrants, reducing the rivalry between firms already in the industry (Ahmed et 
al. 2002, Porter 1980). In highly concentrated industries (with few players), 
firms are more likely to perceive low control risk in host countries. The 
argumentation for this is that firms in highly concentrated industries have fewer 
competitors, and tend to know their competitors better. Because of this 
concentration, firms tend to favour high control modes of entry, thus, 
maintaining barriers to entry into the market (Brouthers 1995, Vernon 1985).  
 
In industries which are characterised by an intensive competition, where many 
competitors exist, and exit are easy, firms will perceive higher control risk, both 
because there is much more competition and because the actions of the large 
number of competitors tend to be unpredictable (Brouthers 1995). Furthermore, 
in highly competitive industries the amount of trained and capable managers in 
the country increases, thus the firm can obtain local partners with sufficient 
knowledge and skills to reduce the need for control (Anderson and Gatignon 
1986, Brouthers 1995). Therefore, in highly competitive industries firms will 
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likely use low control modes of entry in international markets (Ahmed et al. 
2002, Anderson and Gatignon 1986, Gomes-Casseres 1990, Harrigan 1985). 
 
A second relation between industry structure and perceived risk has been 
described in the literature. In highly concentrated industries risk is perceived as 
high as competitors can inflict more damage to each other. Therefore, firms will 
favour high control entry modes in order to combat or threaten to combat their 
competitors (Casson 1987, Graham 1985,). However, it has been found that this 
behaviour based on “threats” appears to only apply to situations where one firm 
is technological weaker than the rival (Casson 1987) and is more applicable to 
the location decision than the mode of entry decision (Brouthers 1995, Vernon 
1974).  
 
Overall, firms will combine the three controls risk variables – management 
experience, cultural difference and industry structure - into a control risk 
evaluation. Firms will then select their entry mode strategies based on their 
perception of control risks in the host country. In markets where control risks 
are low, firms will select entry mode strategies in which they can maintain 
control over the operation. In host countries where control risks are high, firms 
will choose entry mode strategies which shift risks and control to other firms. 
 
2.3.2 Market complexity risks  
The other part of the international risk framework used by Ahmed et al. (2002) 
and Brouthers (1995) is the group of risk factors called market complexity risks. 
Market complexity risks refer to market-specific variables that affect a firm's 
ability to enter a market, distribute it products, and increase or maintain market 
share (Brouthers 1995). These market complexity risks affect the firm's 
management's decision in relation to the amount of resources the firm is willing 
to commit to a specific market (Brouthers 1995). When the host market is similar 
to the home market, firms are more willing to allocate resources, while in 
markets that are very different from the home market, firms are more hesitant to 
allocate resources, and look for ways to reduce their investment. As it was the 
case with controls risks, market complexity risks are based on the management's 
perception of similarities and differences between the home market and host 
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market (Ahmed et al. 2002). Market complexity risks consist of the following 
factors (Brouthers 1995).  
 
2.3.2.1 Political risk  
Political risk reflects uncertainty about the current political conditions and 
government policies that are deemed to be critical to the survival and 
profitability of a firm’s operations in the host country (Agarwal and Ramaswami 
1992, Akhter and Lusch 1988, Brouthers 1995, Sanchez-Peinado et al. 2007). 
Political instability that results from war, revolution, coup, or political turmoil 
can also be political risk (Ahmed et al. 2002). A highly volatile environment will 
result in firms that want to minimize exposure to risk through entry modes that 
offer the necessary flexibility in the environmental uncertainties (Erramilli and 
D’Souza 1995, Kim and Hwang 1992). By reducing resource commitment in risky 
environments, firms minimize their exposure in cases in which they can be 
adversely affected or forced to cease their activity by unforeseen political events 
(Hill et al. 1990).  
 
2.3.2.2 Transfer risk  
Transfer risk is defined as “a government's ability to restrict the free flow of 
goods, services and funds into and out of the host country” (Brouthers 1995 p.16, 
Rasheed 2005, Root 1987). Root (1987) found that in some transition economies 
government policies (e.g. exchange controls, taxation, and currency devaluation) 
restrict foreign firms' access to financial markets and the flow of funds out of the 
country. Restrictions can also be imposed through trade barriers and price 
controls (Ahmed et al. 2002).  
 
2.3.2.3 Operating risk  
Operating risk refers to the possibility of sanctions that could constrain a firm’s 
operations in the host country. More specifically operating risk arise from 
potential restrictions in logistics, marketing, finance, or other business functions 
imposed by a government or by political pressure from interest groups, or due to 
market conditions (Ahmed et al. 2002, Akhter and Lusch 1988, Rasheed 2005). 
According to Haner (1980), it includes the inability of the firm to enforce 
contracts, bureaucratic delays, the quality of local management, and the 
availability of skilled labour and raw materials.  
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2.3.2.4 Ownership risk 
Ownership risk is defined as “the management’s uncertainty about the host 
government's actions in the area of actual control over the firm and its assets, 
through measures such as expropriation, confiscation, domestication, and 
nationalisation” (Ahmed et al. 2002 p. 808, Akhter and Lusch 1988, Rasheed 
2005). Firms involved in international business have to take into consideration 
ownership risk and the possible resulting loss of assets (Jeannet and Hennessey 
1995).  
 
The four risk factors described above is what Root (1987) described as the 
traditional risk factors. Brouthers (1995, p. 16) states that “firms must adjust 
their strategies based on their perceived level of these risk factors in the host 
country. In countries where these risk factors are perceived to be high, market 
complexity risk will also be perceived as being high. In this case, firms will use 
strategies that will minimise their exposure to these risks. If these risk factors 
are perceived as low (low market complexity risk), firms will choose strategies in 
which they provide a greater share of the resources”.  
 
2.3.2.5 Marketing infrastructure 
Marketing infrastructure is defined as “the methods available within a market to 
sell, distribute, advertise, and promote a firm’s product or service” (Ahmed et al. 
2002, p. 808). Marketing infrastructure affects market complexity risks in two 
ways. First, lack of knowledge of marketing infrastructure. When firms advertise, 
distribute and/or sell based on home market experience without adjusting for 
differences in the host market, it can result in unfavourable outcomes (Brouthers 
1995, Ricks 1983). Brouthers (1995, p.17) found that “once a commitment is 
made in the host market and then it is discovered that the marketing 
infrastructure does not correspond with past experience or knowledge, excess 
expenses may by incurred gathering of this new knowledge and experience. As a 
result, a firm’s competitive advantage may disappear”.  
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The lack of a secure and structured infrastructure can also affect risks. A firm’s 
ability to distribute its products to its customers can have a huge impact on the 
performance of the firm. In some countries the physical component of the 
infrastructure is so poor or badly maintained, that it forces the firm to select a 
strategy different from the most preferred (Ahmed et al. 2002, Brouthers 1995). 
If the management perceives that the marketing infrastructure is similar to that 
of the home country, it will likely choose an entry mode strategy that contains 
elements similar to the successful home country strategy. In countries with huge 
differences, management would perceive increased levels of market complexity 
risks and would therefore have to use strategies that help minimize the impact of 
these risks – such as low resource commitment entry modes (Brouthers 1995).  
 
2.3.2.6 Consumer taste 
Consumer taste refers to similarities or differences between consumer taste and 
preferences in the home country and host country (Ahmed et al. 2002). 
Consumer taste is together with the other market complexity risks an 
endogenous variable, which a firm can only react to – not control. Consumer 
taste relates to all preferences of the customer – such as purchasing patterns and 
preferences for substitute products (Ahmed et al. 2002, Evans and Berman 
1994). The firm must evaluate its willingness to invest in an environment where 
its products or services might be used differently than in the home country 
(Ahmed et al. 2002, Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992, Brouthers 1995).  
 
Firms must identify what the consumers need, want, and will buy, then create a 
satisfying mix of goods and services from which buyers can select (Meloan 1995). 
It is important to notice that regarding consumer taste, risk is associated with 
the uncertainty created by a variation in consumer taste, not in shifts in 
consumer demand. The consumer demand risk factor is dealt with under Market 
Demand below. If consumer taste in the host country is similar to that of the 
home country, firms will prefer high resource commitment entry modes, and if 
consumer taste is perceived as being significantly different, firms will favour low 
resource commitment entry modes (Ahmed et al. 2002, Brouthers 1995).   
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2.3.2.7 Competitive rivalry  
The competitiveness of a market affects a firm’s ability to succeed in that market. 
Studies have shown that success and profitability of a firm in a foreign market 
are inversely related to the number of firms with which it must compete in the 
foreign market. A firm that has fewer competitors in the foreign market is more 
likely to succeed in that market than a firm facing many competitors (Ahemd et 
al. 2002, Brouthers 1995, Kim and Hwang 1992, MacMillian and Day 1987, Yoon 
and Lilien 1985).  
 
It is necessary for a firm to analyse the structure of the industry in which it 
operates and examine its competitors on the basis of competitive characteristics 
– such as marketing strategies, competitors, firm size, competitive strategies, 
and channel competition (Ahmed et al. 2002, Evans and Berman 1994). If 
competitive rivalry is high, entering a market would be more difficult and 
management would perceive higher market complexity risks. If competitive 
rivalry is low, entering a market would be more difficult and firms would 
perceive higher market complexity risks. The entry strategy must be adjusted to 
reflect the level of competitive rivalry in the market (Brouthers 1995).  
 
2.3.2.8 Market demand  
Before entering a market firms must conduct customer research to determine 
market demand (Ahmed et al. 2002). Evans and Berman (1994) describe how 
market demand affects risk perception in two ways regarding both the current 
and future market demand. Brouthers (1995, p. 18) found states that “in 
countries that have a high demand for a firm’s product, a firm would perceive 
little risk on entering. This low risk perception is based on the fact that a market 
already exists for the product and the market is sufficient in size to support the 
entry of an additional firm. In countries with low current demand but high 
predictions for future demand, risk perception is also believed to be moderately 
low, again because of the potentially large market for the product in the future. 
In markets where future demand is expected to be low market complexity risks 
are perceived as high, since the firm must command a large share of a small 
market to be profitable”.  
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As it was the case with control risks, Brouthers (1995) found that firms must 
adjust their entry mode strategies based on the firms perception of market 
complexity risk. For markets where market complexity risk is perceived as being 
low, firms will use strategies that involve a high level of resource commitment. 
However, in markets with a high market complexity risks, firms must adjust 
their strategies to minimise the effect of the risks on the firm’s performance and 
will most likely use low resource commitment entry mode strategies (Brouthers 
1995).  
 
Figure 1 below summaries the concept of total perceived international risk. As 
described above, studies have shown a connection between entry modes and 
perceived risk. Furthermore, it has been found in some studies that the various 
risk factors affect each other, and it therefore can be necessary to analyse risk 
under one.  For most of the studies, firms selected entry modes which shifted 
risk to other firms if they perceived the risk being measured was high in the 
foreign host market.  
 
Based on this, Brouthers (1995, p. 19) concluded “that as perceived international 
risk increases, firms will continue to react in a similar manner and select 
strategies that reduce the impact of the risk on the firm or choose entry mode 
strategies that shift the risk to another firm. In countries where perceived risk is 
low, firms will use high control and high resource commitment strategies and 
absorb most – if not all the risks”.  
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Figure 3 – Total perceived international risk 
 
 
 
  
Total perceived 
international risk  
 
Control risk  
1. Management experience 
2. Cultural difference 
3. Industry structure  
 
Market complexity risk  
1. Political risk  
2. Transfer risk 
3. Operating risk  
4. Ownership risk  
5. Marketing infrastructure  
6. Consumer taste  
7. Market demand 
8. Competitive rivalry 
 
Entry mode strategy 
 
1. Exporting (non-equity) 
 
2. Joint venture (equity) 
 
3. Wholly owned subsidiary 
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2.4 Central and Eastern Europe  
As the Soviet bloc began to disintegrate in 1989, the newly democratised 
countries of CEE began to promote market economies and opened their gates to 
international firms. These post-socialistic governments in CEE are in a 
transitional state that fosters an open market economy driven by 
democratization. It is therefore an attractive region in which to forge local 
business relationships through entries for firms seeking to create a local 
presence, expand operations, reduce production costs, increase market share, 
and improve distribution channels (Schoenberg 1998). However, because 
Western firms do not have a lengthy history of operations in CEE, a relatively 
high degree of uncertainty exists for many firms contemplating entry into the 
region (Rondinelli and Black 2000).  
 
Relationships between Western firms and governments in CEE have been shaped 
by the region’s struggle to shed legacies of central planning, and create growing 
market economies. This context has created special challenges for both Western 
firms and local governments to establish relations with each other, understand 
each other’s needs, and to engage in mutually beneficial negotiations. The pace 
of reform depends on each country’s so-called market memory (Wolf and 
Havrylyshyn 2002). Some countries were considered among the developed 
economies prior to World War II while others have gone directly from a feudal or 
early capitalist system to a socialist system (Meyer and Jensen 2004). 
 
In transition economies as the ones of CEE, state owned enterprises are still 
important players and newcomers may find a partnership an important means to 
attain legitimacy (Hoskisson et al. 2000, Lyles et al. 2004, Peng and Heath 
1996). Moreover, where state owned enterprises dominate the economy, they 
also control access to crucial local assets and old-style business networks. State 
owned enterprises in transition economies often pursue network-based growth 
strategies (Peng and Heath 1996), and may thus see a joint venture with a 
foreign partner as an opportunity to strengthen their market position (Fahy et al. 
2000, Hitt et al. 2000). Thus, where state owned enterprises are strong, foreign 
investors may find it more difficult to prosper on their own. They may, therefore, 
seek partnership with local firms (Meyer and Nguyen 2005). 
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The most of entry mode research assumes that the firm has the option to choose 
any entry mode in a given market (Aulakh and Kotabe 1997). The choice of entry 
mode can become more complex for firms operating in transition economies, 
where they face high external uncertainty and internal constraints. A transition 
economy is a market that is growing and shows very good potential, also usually 
becomes a new focus for global attention. As stated above joint ventures and 
contractual agreements have traditionally been the state owned enterprises’ of 
CEE preferred method of foreign participation (Hood and Young 1994). 
 
Joint ventures and contractual entry modes require host country partners. 
However, desirable partners are not always available in new transition 
economies (Gatling 1993). Thus, Western firms making CEE market entry 
decisions may find their mode choice limited by their perceptions of CEE based 
firms, managers and employees (Brouthers et al. 1998). Shama (1995) conducted 
a survey of the entry strategies of U.S. firms into the ex-Soviet states, the Baltic 
States, and East European countries. His findings supported those of McCarthy 
et al. (1993) – namely, that the most popular entry strategies into the region are 
joint ventures and contractual agreements, and that despite its high risk. 
 
In order to optimize control and reduce perceived risk, many Western firms 
make use of detailed and comprehensive contracts in relation to their foreign 
operations.  
 
In CEE, contracts are not regarded with the same respect and are often 
disregarded after signing. While Western firms view a contract as the end of 
negotiations, many in CEE consider it just the beginning and to not strictly 
follow the terms outlined in the signed contract. Western firms recognise that 
contracts in this region do not hold the same power to reduce risk, thus, they 
turn to wholly owned subsidiaries rather than joint ventures (Paik 2005). 
 
Researchers clearly suggest that risk and culture are the main entry barriers in 
the opened markets of CEE (Perlaki 1994, Welch 1993). As the CEE countries 
have opened up their markets, the cultural difference between those acting in a 
centrally planned economy and those from a market economy has been much 
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greater than earlier believed (Brouthers et al. 1998, Casson 1994, Puffer and 
McCarthy 1995).  
 
For instance, Perlaki (1994) suggests (Brouthers et al. 1998, p. 488) that “the 
culture in CEE is characterised by (1) a highly centralised, strictly hierarchical 
structure, (2) a dislike for uncertainty, (3) a preference for formality and 
standardisation, and (4) strong collectivist attitudes”. This cultural behaviour 
can lead to (1) ethical standards which substantially differ from those found in 
Western nations (Brouthers et al. 1998, Puffer and McCarthy 1995), (2) a lack of 
a Western consumer/marketing orientation (Brouthers et al. 1998, Ennew et al. 
1993), and (3) a low level of trust for authority (Brouthers et al. 1998, Casson 
1994). This cultural behaviour can have an impact on Western firm entries 
because they make the costs of finding, negotiating with, and monitoring a CEE-
based partner extremely high (Brouthers et al. 1998). 
 
Brouthers et al. (1998) found that market complexity risk tends to dominate the 
CEE entry mode decision. The market complexity risks in CEE are higher than 
normal for the following reasons; (1) poorly established legal infrastructures, 
making enforcement uncertain and costly (Brouthers et al. 1998, Welch 1993), 
(2) shortages of desirable CEE-based potential partners – if one partner does not 
work out alternative partners may not be available (Brouthers et al. 1998, Gatling 
1993), and (3) low levels of trust found in CEE managers which means that they 
may not work well with managers from the home country (Brouthers et al. 1998, 
Casson 1994). Such high risk elements make it either much more difficult to use 
entry modes with shared control – such as joint ventures and contractual 
agreements, or impossible because the extra cost associated with these modes 
makes their use prohibitive in CEE (Brouthers et al. 1998). 
 
An important type of market complexity risk in transition economies is operating 
risk, which refers to the perceived discontinuity or unpredictability of the 
changes of business environment and regulations. Firms facing high market 
complexity risk retain flexibility and shift risk to local firms or other parties 
(Meyer 2001). Western businesses entering transition economies like the ones in 
CEE also face high transaction costs. They lack information about local partners, 
they must negotiate with agents inexperienced in business negotiations, and they 
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face unclear regulatory frameworks, inexperienced bureaucracies, 
underdeveloped court systems, and corruption (Meyer 2001). Post-entry, firms 
may be concerned about the weak protection of intellectual property, which as 
shown by Oxley (1999) increases firms preferences for full-control entry modes 
(Meyer 2001). 
 
In transition economies, the marketing infrastructure conditions as well as 
government policies toward foreign investment are important to the choice of 
entry mode. The demand in a transition economy can be defined as the actual 
demand of existing customers and the potential demand of local market. A firm 
can generally be expected to be more knowledgeable regarding its demand when 
it enters a transition economy to develop a global sourcing site, or serves its 
domestic customers who have already invested in that market. Therefore, this 
refers to firms preferring to maintain control over their operations and choose an 
entry mode with high involvement level and resource commitment (Erramilli and 
Rao 1990). The competitive structure and high production cost in e.g. Denmark 
encourages entry modes involving local production and influence the strategic 
objectives at the corporate level (Root 1994). The uncertainty of future demand 
conditions is likely to be greater in transition economies and embryonic 
industries in the host country (Harrigan 1988). 
 
However, a firm may decide to enter a foreign market in the interests of 
remaining competitive on a global basis, the form of entry itself is shaped by the 
competition conditions of the market and the intensity of global competition. A 
transition economy is one where rapidly changing macro-economic, social, 
demographic and regulatory factors produce a situation of intense competition. 
Limits of adaptability to changing market and competition conditions lead firms 
to favour entry modes involving low resource commitments when competitive 
pressures in the host country are intense. Cooperation is a more flexible form of 
entry and exit as well as a useful means to improve competitive positioning 
(Harrigan 1988). 
 
To summarise, below is listed some of the characteristics that are important to 
notice for a firm entering into CEE. First, behavioural and environmental risks 
are two of the main barriers to investment in these countries (Brouthers and 
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Brouthers 2003, Brouthers et al. 1998, Perlaki 1994, Welch 1993). Second, joint 
ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries are most common in these countries, 
despite potential legal restrictions (Brouthers and Brouthers 2003, Brouthers et 
al. 1998, Gatling 1993). Third, CEE markets are normally characterised by low 
trust cultures, creating high behavioural risk, an entry barrier for firms wishing 
to use joint venture modes of entry (Brouthers and Brouthers 2003, Casson 
1994, Perlaki 1994). Fourth, researchers are suggesting that political, social and 
environmental risk are still perceived as very high in the region (Brouthers and 
Brouthers 2003, Brouthers et al. 1998, Gatling 1993, Welch 1993), providing a 
barrier to using wholly owned subsidiaries entry modes (Brouthers and 
Brouthers 2003, Erramilli and Rao 1993, Gatignon and Anderson 1988). Hence, 
CEE provided a good location for testing Danish firms’ perception of risk in 
relation to entry modes. Worth mentioning is also, that although most firms 
report a high perceived risk in doing business in CEE, they feel that the sheer 
size and potential of these markets outweighs the risk (Shama 2000). 
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2.4 Risk tolerance 
A measure for firm’s risk tolerance was added as an experimental add-on to the 
model. Risk tolerance refers to an individual’s attitude towards risk across 
situations – either being risk seeking or risk averse (Brush 2003, Levin and 
Stephens 1994). Generally risk tolerance can be classified along a continuum 
anchored between being completely risk averse and risk seeking (Westbrook 
1996). Individuals with low risk tolerance attempt to minimize uncertainty, and 
avoid high-stake problems. A risk neutral individual is indifferent to adventure 
or security, where a risk seeking individual has a preference for situations with 
equivalent value, that have potentially higher payoffs with increased risk as 
opposed to certainty in outcomes (Brush 2003, Varian 1987).  
 
Generally, risk is associated with a specific individual whereas the model 
developed below attempts to link risk to the firm and not the interviewee. 
However, the outcome should not be any different as all the interviewed persons 
all were senior management and key decision-makers. Researchers have found 
that executive decision-makers influence their firm’s strategic decision-making 
processes (Brush 2003, Calori et al. 1994, Hambrick and Finkelstein 1987, Hitt 
and Tyler 1991), and risk tolerance is a crucial variable in managerial decision-
making (March and Shapira 1987). On the other hand, MacCrimmon and 
Wehrung (1985) showed their subjects as more willing to take risks with their 
firm’s resources than their own. So some cautions are needed in concluding 
whether the risk described is that of the interviewee or the firm or both. This is 
an area that still needs further research.  
 
None of the existing literature on entry mode and risk assessment has included 
risk tolerance in their models. Furthermore, the add-on of the risk tolerance 
measure was done under the assumption that risk tolerance has an impact on 
perceived risk or/and entry mode. As not much research has been done in the 
area of a firm’s risk tolerance, the method of measurement of risk tolerance used 
in this survey was party adapted from Brush (2003). 
 
As the literature review indicates no research has been done on Danish firms’ 
perceived risk and their entry into CEE. Furthermore, no known research has 
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included risk tolerance in relation to entry mode and especially not for Danish 
firms.  
 
Based on the logic of the theoretical framework described in the literature review 
as well as the gaps described above, a testable hypothesis is developed. 
According to the theoretical framework, which is based on the work of Miller 
(1992) and Brouthers (1995), a firm adjusts its entry mode based on its 
management’s perception of total international risk. For markets where total 
perceived risk is low, firms will use strategies that involve a high level of resource 
commitment. However, in markets that have high total perceived risk, the 
management must adjust its entry mode strategy to minimize the effects of risk 
on the firm’s performance, hence, they will likely use a low resource commitment 
strategy.  
 
The two main hypotheses are therefore:  
 
H1: In countries where risk is low, firms will select entry strategies in which 
they can maintain control over the operation.  
 
H2: In countries where risk is high, firms will select entry strategies which shift 
risks and control to other firms.  
 
Further, several sub-hypotheses can be developed:  
 
International experience:  
H3: The greater the international experience, the greater is the likelihood that 
the firm will choose a high-control mode of entry. 
 
Cultural difference: 
H4: The greater the cultural difference between the home country and the host 
country, the lesser is the likelihood that the firm will choose a full-control mode. 
 
Industry structure: 
H5: The greater the concentration (few players) of an industry, the more likely 
it is that firms use high control entry modes. 
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Control risk in general: 
H6: In markets where control risks are low, firms will select entry mode 
strategies in which they can maintain control over the operation.  
 
H7: In host countries where control risks are high, firms will choose entry mode 
strategies which shift risks and control to other firms. 
 
Political risk: 
H8: The greater the political risk, the lesser is the likelihood that the firm will 
choose a full-control mode. 
 
Transfer risk: 
H9: The higher the transfer risk, the less likely a firm will be to choose a full-
control entry mode. 
 
Operating risk: 
H10: The greater the operating risk, the less likely a firm will be to choose a 
full-control entry mode. 
 
Ownership risk: 
H11: The greater the ownership risk, the less likely a firm will be to choose a 
full-control entry mode.  
 
Consumer taste: 
H12: The more different the consumer taste, the less resources will be 
committed to the market in the entry mode.  
 
Marketing infrastructure: 
H13: The more different the marketing structure, the less resources will be 
committed to the market in the entry mode.   
 
Competitive rivalry: 
H14: If competitive rivalry is high, the less likely a firm will be to choose a full-
control entry mode.  
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Market demand: 
H15: If demand in a country is low, the less likely a firm will be to choose a full-
control entry mode.  
 
Market Complexity Risks in general: 
H16: In countries where market complexity risk is perceived as being high, 
firms will select strategies that shift the risks to third parties. 
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3. Method 
The following method was used in relation to measurement, surveying and 
analysis.  
 
3.1 Risk measurement  
Perceived risk can be defined as the defined as the business managers’ opinions 
of the difference between the home market and host market (Ahmed et al. 2002 
p. 810). In this case perceived risk was measured by looking at the differences 
and similarities between what the management of the firms were used to dealing 
with in the home country and the situation in the host country. The idea of 
measuring perceived risk this way is that, as the differences between the home 
and host country increase on the variables being measured, the perception of risk 
increases too (Ahmed et al. 2002, Brouthers 1995).  
 
As the framework described above is based on the work of Brouthers (1995) and 
Ahmed et al. 2002, so are the risk measurements below. 
 
The following three risk measurements are what Brouthers (1995) describes as 
the control risks (see chapter 2.3.1 for an in-depth description of control risk).  
 
International management experience was measured by the number of years the 
firm had been operating in CEE. To also include experience gained outside the 
firm e.g. from previous employment, the interviewee’s international 
management experience was also included. This question was asked under the 
assumption that the interviewee plays a central role in the decision-making 
process of matters relating to CEE.  
 
As cultural difference refers to the similarities or differences between the 
cultures of the consumers in the home market versus the host market (Anderson 
and Gatignon 1986), the firms were asked to rate the cultural difference in the 
specific CEE country compared to Denmark from very similar to very different.  
 
Industry structure relates to the degree of concentration of the industry. 
Industry structure was therefore measured by how many players there were and 
how unique the firms product or service is (Brouthers 1995).  
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The following eight risk measurements are what Brouthers (1995) describes as 
the market complexity risk (see chapter 2.3.2 for an in-depth description of 
market complexity risk).  
 
Political risk reflects uncertainty about current political conditions and 
government policies that are deemed to be critical to the survival and 
profitability of a firm’s operations in the host country (Agarwal and Ramaswami 
1992, Akhter and Lusch 1988, Sanchez-Peinado et al. 2007). Therefore political 
risk was measured by the perceived political stability of the firm in relation to 
the specific country.  
 
Transfer risk is defined as a government’s ability to restrict the free flow of 
goods, services and funds into and out of the host country (Rasheed 2005, Root 
1987). Transfer risk was therefore measured how restricted the firm found the 
country to be at the time of entry.  
 
Operating risk refers to the possibility of sanctions that could constrain a firm’s 
operations in the host country. More specifically operating risk arise from 
potential restrictions in logistics, marketing, finance, or other business functions 
imposed be a government or by political pressure from interest groups, or due to 
market conditions (Akhter and Lusch 1988, Rasheed 2005). Operating risk was 
therefore measured by the perceived likelihood of the host government enforcing 
restrictions on the firm’s operations.  
 
Ownership risk is defined as the management’s uncertainty about the host 
government’s actions in the area of actual control over the firm and its assets, 
through measures such as expropriation, confiscation, domestication, and 
nationalisation (Akhter and Lusch 1988, Rasheed 2005). Ownership risk was 
therefore measured by the firm’s perceived likelihood of the host government 
taking over the firm’s operations.  
 
Consumer taste refers to similarities or differences between consumer taste and 
preferences in the home country and host country. Consumer taste relates to all 
preferences of the customer – such as purchasing patterns and preferences for 
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substitute products (Evans and Berman 1994). Consumer taste in the country 
was therefore measured by its similarities or differences to Denmark.  
 
Marketing infrastructure refers to the methods available within a market to sell, 
distribute, advertise, and promote a firm’s product or service (Brouthers 1995). 
The marketing infrastructure in the country was therefore measured by it 
similarities and differences to Denmark.  
 
The level of competition of a market affects a firm’s ability to succeed in that 
market. If competitive rivalry is high, entering a market would be more difficult 
and management would perceive higher market complexity risks. If competitive 
rivalry is low, entering a market would be more difficult and firms would 
perceive higher market complexity risks (Brouthers 1995). Competitive rivalry 
was therefore measured by how the firm experience the competition in the 
market and how it saw its development.   
 
Market demand affects risk perception in two ways regarding both the current 
and future market demand (Evans and Berman 1994). Brouthers (1995, p. 18) 
found that ”in countries that have a high demand for a firm’s product, a firm 
would perceive little risk of entering. This low risk perception is based on the fact 
that a market already exists for the product and the market is sufficient in size to 
support the entry of an additional firm. In countries with low current demand 
but high predictions for future demand, risk perception is also believed to be 
moderately low, again because of the potentially large market for the product in 
the future. In markets where future demand is expected to be low market 
complexity risks are perceived as high, since the firm must command a large 
share of a small market to be profitable”. Market demand was therefore 
measured by asking the firms about the current demand and the future potential 
for their products or services.  
 
International experience was measured in years. All other variables were 
measured on a five point scale: (1) low risk and (5) high risk. This falls in line 
with other studies on perceived risk and entry modes (Brouthers 1995).  
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3.2 Entry mode measurement  
Entry mode was grouped into three groups:  
 
1. Wholly owned subsidiary 
2. Joint venture  
3. Exporting (non-equity) 
 
This classification is widely used by other researchers in the area of entry mode 
strategy (Ahmed et al. 2002, Brouthers et al. 1993, Brouthers 1995, Buckley and 
Casson 1981, Contractor 1984, Czinkota et al. 1994, Erramilli and Rao 1990, Hill 
and Kim 1988, Hill et al. 1990, Hirsch 1976, Kim and Hwang 1992, Minor et al. 
1991, Mirus 1980, Naumann and Lincoln 1991, Rugman 1981, Teece 1983, 1985, 
1986, Young et al. 1989 – see e.g. Caves 1982 and Root 1987 for an extensive 
discussion).  
 
A firm who had chosen wholly owned subsidiary as an entry mode was coded 
with the score 1, one who had chosen joint venture was coded with the score 2, 
and finally one who had chosen exporting was coded with the score 3.  
 
To ensure the usefulness of the model, it was investigated whether it was 
possible for a foreign firm to obtain 100% ownership of its foreign operation in 
the 10 CEE EU countries.3 The legislation from 1990 and onwards was 
investigated. This was done by contacting relevant authorities in all 10 countries. 
The results are as follow: 
 
Table 3.2.1 Possibility of WOS for foreign firms in CEE 
Country Year Source 
Bulgaria 1992 Bulgaria Foreign Investment Agency 
Czech Republic 1993 Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency 
Estonia 1992 Invest in Estonia 
Hungary 1990 Hungarian Investment and Trade Development Agency 
Latvia 1990 Investment and Development Agency of Latvia 
Lithuania 1991 Lithuanian Development Agency 
Poland 1991 Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency 
Romania 1990 Romanian Agency for Foreign Investment  
Slovakia 1993 Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency 
Slovenia 1991 Public Agency of Republic of Slovenia  
                                                        
3 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
Romania. 
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As a consequence of the information in table 3.2.1 above, only entries that have 
taken place after full ownership was possible for a foreign firm in the particular 
country have been included in the survey. The Czech Republic and Slovakia was 
the last countries out of the 10 to allow foreign firms full ownership over local 
subsidiaries – this happened on January 1 1993. For further details please refer 
to appendix 2.  
 
As neither Brouthers (1995) nor Ahmed et al. (2002) have included control 
variables in their analysis in relation to entry modes and risk, these have 
therefore been not been included in this study. By control variable means control 
for e.g. firm size and industry – other factors that can affect entry mode choice.  
 
3.3 Risk tolerance measurement 
The model for measurement of risk tolerance is based on five areas identified by 
Brush (2003) as central in relation to a firm’s risk tolerance. There was a 
question relating to each of these areas in the questionnaire. First, there was a 
question on whether the firm preferred certainty in its international business 
relations, even if it could involve a lower level of business performance. Second, 
whether the firm found research to be important before making a risky decision. 
Third, whether the firm only takes risks in areas it knows well. Fourth, whether 
the firm approaches business transactions with a high degree of caution. And 
finally, whether the firm preferred to participate in low-risk low pay-off ventures 
rather than high-risk high pay-off ventures (please refer to appendix 1 for further 
details).  
 
The interviewees were asked to provide responses to these questions that 
reflected their firm’s general attitude towards business risk, without reference to 
any specific business relationship or project. The answers were measured on a 
five-point scale bounded by strongly agree and strongly disagree.  
 
Finally, it is important to stress that the information gathered through the survey 
is all subjective to the firms interviewed. All the perceived risk and risk tolerance 
measures are based on the firms’ perception and none of it is related to a 
measurement confirmation by a third party.  
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3.4 Survey and data 
Since Denmark is a small and open economy with a very limited domestic 
market, Danish firms have to internationalise their business successfully if they 
want to acquire a larger customer base. There should therefore be a good 
potential for useable survey material among Danish firms. The survey was 
completed among the members of Confederation of Danish Industry (DI).  
 
DI is a private organisation funded, owned and managed entirely by 11,000 
companies within manufacturing, trade and service industry – covering virtually 
all sub-sectors. A number of sectoral employers' associations and branch 
federations exist within DI's framework, being integrated in part or in full in DI4.  
 
The firms used for this study were selected at random among the members of DI 
with activities in Central and Eastern Europe. A random sample of 49 firms was 
selected. Data about each of these firms were collected in two stages. Secondary 
data about each of the selected firms was collected from its Internet site, DI 
database and KOB5. This research provided useful background information about 
the firms and the names of appropriate executive contacts.6  
 
Each such executive was contacted by telephone and was asked to respond to the 
survey questions, then or at a mutually convenient time. Typically, it took 3-5 
telephone calls to establish contact with the appropriate person. Some interviews 
were conducted as personal interviews. To add to this complexity, the titles of 
the executive contacted varied from Chief Executive Officer to Sales Manager to 
Exporting Manager – all senior management.7 Follow-up interviews were 
conducted to alleviate any disparities in the collected data.  
 
                                                        
4 For more information about DI visit www.di.dk.  
5 The KOB is a Danish company database containing information about all registered companies 
in Denmark. For more information see: www.kob.dk 
6 In line with the work of John (1984), who argues for selecting knowledgeable informants, the 
choice of this respondent group was based on the belief that people in these positions are most 
knowledgeable on international entry projects and the dynamics of the overall foreign entry 
decision process.  
7 The survey comply with the ethical guidelines of Lincoln University, however it will not have to 
be approved by the Human Ethics Committee, because the people in the survey are interviewed 
in their professional capability. 
 46
Once contact was established, 67% of the executives agreed to answer the 
questions. The answers were recorded in the questionnaire – one for each 
country and entry. See appendix 1 for a translated version of the questionnaire in 
English. All interviews were conducted in Danish. To stay in line with the 
transition economy theories regarding CEE, only entries after 1990-93 were 
used. This is explained in further detail in appendix 2.  
 
In some cases, the questionnaire was faxed or e-mailed because the interviewees 
did not have all needed information at the time of the interview.  
 
The average interview took approximate 25 minutes to complete, which add up 
to a total interview time of 13 hours and 45 minutes.  
  
Altogether, 49 firms were contacted and 44 responded, making the response rate 
90%. 5 firms were not interested in participating in the survey. Out of the 44 
positive responses, 11 had not had any activities in CEE and were therefore 
excluded from the survey, which resulted in a useable response rate of 67%.  
 
The response rate of 67% compares very favourably with rates reported in other 
surveys that involve chief executive officers (Chang and Taylor 1999, Samiee and 
Walters 1991, Sanchez-Peinado 2007). Furthermore, the response rate compares 
very favourably with rates in other surveys in the entry mode literature Agarwal 
and Ramaswami (1992): 18%, Bello and Williamson (1985): 33%, Erramilli and 
Rao (1993): 44%, Kim and Hwang (1992): 15%, and Klein et al. (1990): 41%. 
Werner et al. (1996) did a study on entry modes and risk, which had a response 
rate 18%.  
 
The questionnaire included questions on risk and entry mode, as well as risk 
tolerance.  
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3.5 Analytical methodology  
The data from the questionnaires was first subjected to an independence test. 
For this a Fisher’s Exact Test was used on the variables (expect for years of 
experience which are not categorical variables), as it is an exact method 
compared to for example the Chi Square test, which is approximate (Andersen et 
al. 1998). The test was used to test if the two distributions are the same. A p-
value of less than o.05 means the hypothesis of similar distributions can be 
rejected, indicating the two distributions are different from each other and there 
is correlation. Whereas a p>0.05 means it cannot be rejected that the 
distributions are the same. This analytical method gives an indication of whether 
a firm is more likely to choose a specific entry mode based on their perceived 
risk, basically whether there is a correlation between entry mode and risk 
perception.  
 
To get a measure of the correlation’s practical impact (probability), the risk 
variables with p-values less than 0.05 (which were 8 plus the 2 variables for 
experience) were individually subjected to a binominal logistic regression 
analysis (Andersen et al. 1998). The entry mode was the categorical dependent 
variable and the perceived risks were the independent variables. Furthermore, 
the risk tolerance measures were also tested against the entry mode variable – 
again with the entry mode variable as the categorical dependent variable and the 
risk tolerance measures as independent variables. 
 
The logistic model is: Pr(entry mode) = f(control risks, market complexity risks)  
 
Based on the individual regression analysis of the 10 variables, the 7 variables 
which showed correlation (p<0.05) in this were subjected to a new regression 
analysis with all the variables in one model in an effort to identify the preferred 
model for the data. The preferred model is the one that describes the dataset 
best. By using Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) the preferred model was 
identified. Before a new model was tested the variables with the highest p-value 
in the previous model was removed. This continued until model with the lowest 
AIC was identified – the preferred model.  
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As the majority of the surveyed firms answered the same in relation to perceived 
risk regardless of country of entry, most of the observations (answers) for the 
same firm are the same. These observations may therefore from a statistical 
point of view not be regarded as independent. An example could be that a firm 
with eight entries into CEE answered the same in relation to cultural difference 
for all eight countries. However, it could be argued that these observations are 
dependent the opposite could also be the case. As the dataset has multiple 
responses from many firms, it is not clear whether these should be treated as 
independent observations or not. Some of the issues that need to be considered 
are discussed in the next few paragraphs.   
 
First of all, it could be argued that some firms regard a specific kind of risk the 
same regardless of country or region. As some of the firms in the survey have 
answered the same for all countries in CEE they have entered, they could 
possibly also have answered that for their markets in e.g. Western Europe – an 
example could be political stability (government take-over). Many firms 
regarded the risk of government take-over as minimal in all of the countries they 
have entered in CEE, which is probably also the case for their Western European 
markets.  
 
Second, it can also be argued that because the firms have not been presented for 
the concept of CEE as one region consisting of quite similar countries, they do 
not regard it as such. They might score one type of risk similar across all 
countries and then another different for all the same countries. Therefore, it 
could be argued that the dependence between the entries is minimal if existing. 
 
Third, it might be the case that the firm has the same level of perceived risk for 
all or a specific group of foreign markets. They might only have detailed 
knowledge about one or two of their markets and the rest they just group under 
one regardless of geographical location. This could be a question of resources, 
e.g. they do not have the manpower to follow the markets as close as they would 
like, or they do not have the financial resources to visit these markets often 
enough to have a sufficient level of knowledge.  
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Fourth, the firm might not have the capabilities to comprehend or act according 
to the various risk factors. Some firms might have the technical skills to produce 
their product but lack the skills of the international sales activities and therefore 
are not able to distinguish between the different countries in CEE or elsewhere. 
This all leads to the argumentation that even though a firm has answered the 
same for a couple of entries it is not enough to conclude that these answers 
(observations) are not independent.   
 
As a consequence of this, the data was then weighted according to the 33 firms 
and the 8 variables that showed correlation in the Fisher’s Exact Test together 
with the two experience measures were subjected individually to a binominal 
logistic regression analysis.  
 
The data was written down on paper during the interviews and then entered into 
Excel 2007. All analysis was conducted using R 2.9.  
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4. Analysis and results  
The 33 positive responses in the survey added up to a total of 173 entries. Out of 
these 27 (16%) had chosen wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) as their entry mode, 
3 (2%) joint venture (JV) and 143 (82%) had chosen to export (EXP) to the 
specific market. Because only 3 had chosen joint venture as their entry mode, 
these 3 was excluded from the survey. The number of observations in that 
category was too small to generate a robust analysis. The analysis thus focused 
on the differences between the two remaining entry modes: WOS and EXP. This 
categorisation appears to be common practice in entry mode research with 
highly skewed samples (Brouthers et al. 1998, Erramilli 1996).   
 
The data therefore consist of 170 entries divided between 27 wholly-owned 
subsidiaries and 143 exporting entries.   
 
Table 4.1 Entries per country 
Country EXP WOS Total 
Bulgaria 10 0 10 
Czech Republic 19 4 23 
Estonia 14 3 17 
Hungary 16 2 18 
Latvia 14 3 17 
Lithuania 14 4 18 
Poland 18 6 24 
Romania 11 3 14 
Slovakia 12 2 14 
Slovenia 15 0 15 
Total  143 27 170 
 
As table 4.1 above shows the entries are fairly even distributed among the CEE 
countries both in terms of exporting entries (EXP) and wholly-owned subsidiary 
entries (WOS). Poland had the most entries with 24 in total – 18 EXP and 6 
WOS, and Bulgaria the fewest with 10 EXP and 0 WOS. As it has been concluded 
in previous research (Brouthers et al. 1998), this can lead to the assumption that 
the CEE countries can be regarded as one region. This is also supported by the 
fact that some of the respondents gave the same answer for all the countries they 
had entered, which can be seen as they regard the CEE as one region with the 
same level of risk. Furthermore, since the number of entries per country is too 
small to test separately, all CEE countries will be considered one homogenous 
group for analytical purposes – also done in Brouthers et al. 1998.  
 51
 
The 33 firms had an average number of employees of 136. This is significantly 
higher than the average Danish firm which in 2007 had in average 7.7 employees 
(Statistics Denmark 1).  
 
 Table 4.2 Distribution of firms according to number of employees 
Number of employees  1 2-4 5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100+ 
Danish firms, per cent  40.2 26.3 14.7 9.8 5.9 1.9 1.2 
Surveyed firms, number 0 0 2 3 8 6 13 
Surveyed firms, per cent 0 0 6.2 9.4 25.0 18.8 40.6 
 Source: Statistics Denmark (2007) and own survey 
 
As table 4.2. above shows, a large amount of the Danish firms only have one 
employee (40.2 percent) and 80 percent of the firms have less than 10 
employees, whereas the surveyed firms have an almost opposite distribution with 
more than 80 per cent having more than 20 employees. This could indicate that 
the majority of Danish firms entering CEE have more employees than the Danish 
firm in general. An important factor in relation to this could be that over 40 per 
cent of all Danish firms only have one employee and almost two-thirds have 
fewer than five employees, and these smalls firms rarely have any significant 
export activities.  
 
These employees also have a different distribution in the surveyed firms and the 
average Danish firm. Table 4.3 shows that the surveyed firms’ 4.363 employees 
are distributed differently than the Danish firms in general. 84 per cent is 
employed in companies with more 100 employees whereas it is only 40 per cent 
for Danish firms in general.  
 
 Table 4.38 Employees distribution in Danish and surveyed firms 
Number of employees  0-9 10-19 20-99 100+  Total 
Danish firms, employees, percent  26.4 10.1 22.6 40.9 100 
Surveyed firms, employees, number 16 42 630 3,675 4,363 
Surveyed firms, employees, percent 0.4 1.0 14.4 84.2 100 
 Source: Statistics Denmark (2007) and own survey 
 
                                                        
8 The categories are different (fewer) in table 4.3 than in 4.2 as it was not possible to obtain the 
data from Statistics Denmark more detailed.  
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Together with the average number of employees this shows a significant 
difference in the Danish firms entering CEE compared to the average Danish 
firm. However, the uncertainty relating to the low number of surveyed firms 
must be taken into account. 
 
The average number of years of international experience for the firms in the 
survey was 22.6 years. The firms’ international experience had a spread of 2 to 
48 years of experience. 
 
The average number of years of CEE experience for the firms in the survey was 
10.6 years. The firms CEE experience had a spread of 1 to 18 years of experience.  
 
The remaining data has been organized in the frequency tables below.  
 
Table 4.4 Frequency table – part 1 
Variable  Entry 
mode 
1 2 3 4 5 
Cultural 
difference 
WOS 18 (67%)  4 (15%) 3 (11%) 2 (7%) 0 (0%) 
EXP 38 (27%) 33 (23%) 30 (21%) 36 (25%) 6 (4%) 
Total 56 (33%) 37 (22%) 33 (19%) 38 (22%) 6 (4%) 
Competitors 
WOS 4 (15%) 9 (33%) 1 (4%) 9 (33%) 4 (15%) 
EXP 7 (5%) 24 (17%) 4 (3%) 64 (45%) 44 (31%) 
Total 11 (6%) 33 (19%) 5 (3%) 73 (43%) 48 (28%) 
Similar 
products on 
the market 
WOS 5 (19%) 7 (26%) 2 (7%) 6 (22%) 7 (26%) 
EXP 8 (6%) 28 (20%) 17 (12%) 56 (39%)  34 (24%) 
Total 13 (8%) 35 (21%) 19 (11%) 62 (36%) 41 (24%) 
Political 
stability 
WOS 23 (85%) 4 (15%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
EXP 91 (64%) 44 (31%) 8 (6%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Total 114 (67%) 48 (28%) 8 (5%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Political 
impact 
WOS 23 (85%) 4 (15%) 0 (0%)  0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
EXP 97 (68%) 24 (17%) 11 (8%) 8 (6%) 3 (2%) 
Total 120 (71%) 28 (16%) 11 (6%) 8 (5%) 3 (2%) 
Trade 
restrictions 
WOS 23 (85%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 4 (15%) 0 (0%) 
EXP 109 (76%) 10 (7%) 4 (3%) 17 (12%) 3 (2%) 
Total 132 (78%) 10 (6%) 4 (2%) 21 (12%) 3 (2%) 
Government 
enforced 
restrictions 
WOS 22 (81%) 4 (15%) 0 (0%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 
EXP 121 (85%) 3 (2%) 2 (1%) 14 (10%) 3 (2%) 
Total 143 (84%) 7 (4%) 2 (1%) 15 (9%) 3 (2%) 
Government 
take-over 
WOS 27 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
EXP 139 (97%) 2 (1%) 2 (1%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Total 166 (98%) 2 (1%) 2 (1%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Consumer 
taste 
WOS 25 (93%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 
EXP 81 (57%) 42 (29%) 6 (4%) 14 (10%) 0 (0%) 
Total 106 (62%) 43 (25%) 6 (4%) 15 (9%) 0 (0%) 
Marketing 
WOS 18 (67%) 8 (30%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
EXP 89 (62%) 34 (24%) 3 (2%) 13 (9%) 4 (3%) 
Total 107 (63%) 42 (25%) 4 (2%) 13 (8%) 4 (2%) 
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The data for cultural difference (the term described in chapter 3.1.2) shown in 
table 4.4 relates to the difference or similarities between the cultures of the 
consumers in the home market and those of the host market. Firms answering 1 
indicates that they find the culture of the consumers in the specific country very 
similar to Denmark and firms answering 5 find the culture to be very different 
from Denmark. Sixty seven percent of the firms with a WOS entry found the 
consumer culture to be very similar to Denmark, whereas this was only the case 
for 27% of the firms with an EXP entry. Overall the perceptions are spread out, 
though only a few firms found the cultural difference to be very different from 
Denmark – none with a WOS entry. When a Fisher’s Exact Test (FET) is applied 
to the data it gave a p-value of 0.003, which means the hypothesis of similar 
distributions can be rejected, indicating the two distributions are different from 
each other.  
 
The data for competitors (the term described in chapter 3.1.3 under industry 
structure) shown in table 4.4 relates to the number of competitors the firm has in 
the specific country of entry. Firms answering 1 indicates they have one or two 
main competitors and firms answering 5 have many competitors. For firms with 
a WOS entry the distribution is quite even, though a majority have answered 
either 2 or 4. For firms with an EXP entry the majority seems to have quite a few 
competitors in the market. A Fisher’s Exact Test applied to the data gave a p-
value of 0.038 (p<0.05), which means the hypothesis of similar distributions can 
be rejected, indicating the two distributions are different from each other.  
 
The data for similar products on the market (the term described in chapter 3.1.3 
under industry structure) shown in table 4.4 relates to the amount of similar 
products/services on the host market. Firms answering 1 indicates they have a 
unique product or services whereas firms answering 5 experience many similar 
products or services on the host market. For firms with a WOS entry the 
distribution is fairly even, whereas for firms with an EXP entry the majority finds 
there are quite many similar products on the host market. A Fisher’s Exact Test 
applied to the data gave a p-value of 0.119 (p>0.05), and it can therefore not be 
rejected that the two distributions are the similar.  
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The data for political stability (the term described in chapter 3.2.1 under political 
risk) shown in table 4.4 relates to how the firm rates the political stability in the 
host country. Firms answering 1 indicates that the host country is highly stable 
politically, whereas firms answering 5 regard the country as highly unstable 
politically. The far majority of the firms – whether with a WOS entry or an EXP 
entry – regard the host countries as stable or highly stable politically. None of 
the firms regard any of the countries as unstable or highly unstable politically. A 
Fisher’s Exact Test applied to the data gave a p-value of 0.088 (p>0.05), and it 
can therefore not be rejected that the two distributions are the similar. However, 
the zero observations in category 4 and 5 for both entry modes might have an 
increasing effect on the p-value. 
 
The data for political impact (the term described in chapter 3.2.1 under political 
risk) shown in table 4.4 relates to if the firm foresee any impact on its operations 
caused by the political environment. Firms answering 1 indicates that they 
foresee no impact on their operations, whereas firms answering 5 foresee high 
impact on their operations caused by the political environment. The far majority 
of the firms have indicated no foreseeable impact or only a little impact (answer 
1 or 2). The percentage for WOS entries is higher than for EXP entries when it 
comes to answer 1 (no impact). None of the WOS entries foresee any political 
impact above answer 2, and only a little minority of the EXP entries foresee 
political impact. A Fisher’s Exact Test applied to the data gave a p-value of 0.399 
(p>0.05), and it can therefore not be rejected that the two distributions are the 
similar. However, the zero observations in category 3, 4 and 5 for WOS might 
have an increasing effect on the p-value. 
 
The data for trade restrictions (the term described in chapter 3.2.2 under 
transfer risk) shown in table 4.4 relates to whether the firm experienced any 
restrictions in relation to bringing goods, services and funds in and out of the 
host country. Firms answering 1 meant they found the country unrestricted and 
firms answering 5 found the country highly restricted. The far majority of the 
WOS entries (85%) did not meet any restrictions and the same goes for 76% of 
the EXP entries. A bit over 10% of the firms experienced some restrictions 
(answer 4). A Fisher’s Exact Test applied to the data gave a p-value of 0.652 
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(p>0.05), and it can therefore not be rejected that the two distributions are the 
similar.   
 
The data for government enforced restrictions (the term described in chapter 
3.2.3 under operating risk) shown in table 4.4 relates to how likely the firms find 
it, that government enforced restrictions will affect their firm’s operation in the 
host country. Firms answering 1 indicates that they find it very unlikely and 
firms answering 5 find it very likely. The majority of both WOS entries and EXP 
entries found the countries unrestricted in relation to government enforced 
restrictions. Less than 20% felt they met any restrictions. A Fisher’s Exact Test 
applied to the data gave a p-value of 0.068 (p>0.05), and it can therefore not be 
rejected that the two distributions are the similar. However, the p-value is only 
slightly above 0.05. 
 
The data for government take-over (the term described in chapter 3.2.4 under 
ownership risk) shown in table 4.4 relates to the risk of the government taking 
over the firm’s operation in the host country. Firms answering 1 find 
governmental take-overs very unlikely and firms answering 5 find them very 
likely. It is very clear to see this is not a risk variable any of the surveyed firms 
find to be an issues regardless of entry mode. All WOS entries find governmental 
take-overs very unlikely, which is also the case with EXP entries (97%). Such 
similar distributions gave – when applied a Fisher’s Exact Test – a p-value of 1.0 
(p>0.05), which clearly indicates that it cannot be rejected that the two 
distributions are the similar. 
 
The data for consumer taste (the term described in chapter 3.2.6) shown in table 
4.4 relates to how the firms find the taste of the consumers of the host country 
compared to Denmark. Firms answering 1 found them very similar to Denmark 
and firms answering 5 found them very different from Denmark. In relation to 
WOS entries the far majority (93%) found them to be very similar to Denmark, 
whereas the distribution for EXP entries was a bit more uneven, though, still 
with the majority of firms finding it quite similar (86% answering either 1 or 2). 
None of the firms found the consumer taste to be very different from Denmark. A 
Fisher’s Exact Test applied to the data gave a p-value of 0.003 (p<0.05), which 
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means the hypothesis of similar distributions can be rejected, indicating the two 
distributions are different from each other.   
 
The data for marketing (the term described in chapter 3.2.5 under marketing 
infrastructure) shown in table 4.4 relates to how the firms find the methods 
available to sell, advertise and promote their products in the host country. Firms 
answering 1 find the methods very similar to Denmark and firms answering 5 
find them very different from Denmark. The two distributions are quite similar, 
which also is indicated in the p-value below. The majority of firms find they can 
use similar marketing methods in the CEE countries as they use in Denmark. A 
Fisher’s Exact Test applied to the data gave a p-value of 0.122 (p>0.05), and it 
can therefore not be rejected that the two distributions are the similar. 
 
The data for competition (the term described in chapter 3.2.7 under competitive 
rivalry) shown in table 4.5 below relates to how the firms find the current level of 
competition in the host market. Firms answering 1 find the competition almost 
non-existing whereas firms answering 5 find the competition very fierce. The 
majority of the WOS entries report some level of competition and none have 
been met by competition free market. The EXP entries report a slightly higher 
level of competition with over 75% stating the competition as fierce or very fierce 
(answering 4 or 5). A Fisher’s Exact Test applied to the data gave a p-value of 
0.002 (p<0.05), which means the hypothesis of similar distributions can be 
rejected, indicating the two distributions are different from each other. 
 
The data for competition development (the term described in chapter 3.2.7 under 
competitive rivalry) shown in table 4.5 below relates to how the firms find the 
development in the competition. Firms answering 1 find it declining and firms 
answering 5 find it increasing. Most of the WOS entries either find the 
competition stable or slightly increasing, whereas the EXP entries are leaning 
more towards increasing at a higher degree. A Fisher’s Exact Test applied to the 
data gave a p-value of 0.007 (p<0.05), which means the hypothesis of similar 
distributions can be rejected, indicating the two distributions are different from 
each other. 
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Table 4.5 Frequency table – part 2 
Variable  Entry 
mode 
1 2 3 4 5 
Competition 
WOS 0 (0%) 9 (33%) 5 (19%) 9 (33%) 4 (15%) 
EXP 3 (2%) 8 (6%) 23 (16%) 84 (59%) 25 (17%) 
Total 3 (2%) 17 (10%) 28 (16%) 93 (55%) 29 (17%) 
Competition 
development 
WOS 6 (22%) 3 (11%) 5 (19%) 12 (44%) 1 (4%) 
EXP 5 (3%) 9 (6%) 33 (23%) 72 (50%) 24 (17%) 
Total 11 (6%) 12 (7%) 38 (22%) 84 (49%) 25 (15%) 
Market 
demand 
WOS 10 (37%) 13 (48%) 1 (4%) 3 (11%) 0 (0%) 
EXP 42 (29%) 59 (41%) 27 (19%) 15 (10%) 0 (0%) 
Total 52 (31%) 72 (42%) 28 (16%) 18 (11%) 0 (0%) 
Market 
potential  
WOS 13 (48%) 14 (52%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
EXP 43 (30%) 63 (44%) 25 (17%) 7 (5%) 5 (3%) 
Total 56 (33%) 77 (45%) 25 (15%) 7 (4%) 5 (3%) 
International 
business 
relations 
WOS 22 (81%) 2 (7%) 1 (4%) 2 (7%) 0 (0%) 
EXP 78 (55%) 38 (27%) 19 (13%) 8 (6%) 0 (0%) 
Total 100 (59%) 40 (24%) 20 (12%) 10 (6%) 0 (0%) 
Research 
WOS 6 (22%) 12 (44%) 8 (30%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 
EXP 27 (19%) 82 (57%) 32 (22%) 2 (1%) 0 (0%) 
Total 33 (19%) 94 (55%) 40 (24%) 3 (2%) 0 (0%) 
Core areas of 
knowledge 
WOS 11 (41%) 13 (48%) 2 (7%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 
EXP 53 (37%) 58 (41%) 21 (15%) 11 (8%) 0 (0%) 
Total 64 (38%) 71 (42%) 23 (14%) 12 (7%) 0 (0%) 
Caution in 
business 
transactions 
WOS 8 (30%) 13 (48%) 4 (15%) 2 (7%) 0 (0%) 
EXP 53 (37%) 48 (34%) 11 (8%) 31 (22%) 0 (0%) 
Total 61 (36%) 61 (36%) 15 (9%) 33 (19%) 0 (0%) 
Risk in 
ventures 
WOS 19 (70%) 2 (7%) 2 (7%) 3 (11%) 1 (4%) 
EXP 68 (48%) 30 (21%) 29 (20%) 16 (11%) 0 (0%) 
Total 87 (51%) 32 (19%) 31 (18%) 19 (11%) 1 (1%) 
 
The data for market demand (the term described in chapter 3.2.8) shown in table 
4.5 relates to how the firms find the current market demand for their product or 
services in the host market. Firms answering 1 find there is a high demand and 
firms answering 5 find there is a low demand. The two distributions are fairly 
similar. None of the firms find the demand is low and the majority is leaning 
towards the high demand end of the scale – answering 1 or 2. A Fisher’s Exact 
Test applied to the data gave a p-value of 0.240 (p>0.05), and it can therefore 
not be rejected that the two distributions are the similar. 
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The data for market potential (the term described in chapter 3.2.8 under market 
demand) shown in table 4.5 relates to how the firms expect the future market 
potential to be for their products in the host country. Firms answering 1 expect 
the potential to be high and firms answering 5 expect the potential to be low. All 
WOS entries are in the high end of the scale – answering either 1 or 2. Whereas 
the distribution for EXP entries is a bit more spread out, with more firms 
indicating the potential to be somewhat in between high and low. A Fisher’s 
Exact Test applied to the data gave a p-value of 0.038 (p<0.05), which means the 
hypothesis of similar distributions can be rejected, indicating the two 
distributions are different from each other.   
 
In table 4.5 are data that relates to whether the firms strongly agree (answer 1) 
or strongly disagree (answer 5) with the statement that their firm prefers 
certainty in its international business relationships, even if this could involve a 
lower level of business performance. The international business relations are 
part of the risk tolerance measurement described in chapter 2.4. The far majority 
of the WOS entries strongly agree with the statement (81%) and none strongly 
disagree. The distribution for the EXP entries is not that one-sided and more 
firms are leaning toward the middle of the scale. A Fisher’s Exact Test applied to 
the data gave a p-value of 0.032 (p<0.05), which means the hypothesis of similar 
distributions can be rejected, indicating the two distributions are different from 
each other. 
 
In table 4.5 are data that relates to whether the firms strongly agree (answer 1) 
or strongly disagree (answer 5) with the statement that research is important 
before making a risky decision. The research is part of the risk tolerance 
measurement described in chapter 2.4. The two distributions are quite similar 
with all answers leaning towards answer 1-3. None of the firms strongly disagree 
with the statement. A Fisher’s Exact Test applied to the data gave a p-value of 
0.491 (p>0.05), and it can therefore not be rejected that the two distributions are 
the similar.   
 
In table 4.5 are data that relates to whether the firms strongly agree (answer 1) 
or strongly disagree (answer 5) with the statement that their firm only takes risks 
in areas it know well. The core areas of knowledge are part of the risk tolerance 
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measurement described in chapter 2.4. There is two distributions are quite 
similar with most firms agreeing with the statement and no firms that strongly 
disagree. A Fisher’s Exact Test applied to the data gave a p-value of 0.706 
(p>0.05), and it can therefore not be rejected that the two distributions are the 
similar. 
 
In table 4.5 are data that relates to whether the firms strongly agree (answer 1) 
or strongly disagree (answer 5) with the statement that their firm approaches 
business transactions with a high degree of caution. Caution in business 
transactions is part of the risk tolerance measurement described in chapter 2.4. 
The majority of the firms indicate some sort of caution and most are answering 
either 1 or 2 regardless of entry mode. None of the firms strongly disagree with 
the statement. A Fisher’s Exact Test applied to the data gave a p-value of 0.124 
(p>0.05), and it can therefore not be rejected that the two distributions are the 
similar.  
 
In table 4.5 are data that relates to whether the firms strongly agree (answer 1) 
or strongly disagree (answer 5) with the statement that their firm prefers to 
participate in low-risk low pay-off ventures rather than high-risk high pay-off 
ventures. The risk in ventures is part of the risk tolerance measurement 
described in chapter 2.4. For the WOS entries most firms strongly agree with the 
statement, though a couple disagree. The distributions is not so one-sided for the 
EXP entries as they tend to be more spread out, though still with the majority of 
the firms agreeing with the statement. Hardly any of the firms strongly disagree. 
A Fisher’s Exact Test applied to the data gave a p-value of 0.029 (p<0.05), which 
means the hypothesis of similar distributions can be rejected, indicating the two 
distributions are different from each other. 
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To summarise, the variables in table 4.6 below have all shown a relation between 
perceived risk and entry mode (p<0.05).  
 
Table 4.6 Variables with correlation 
Variable  P-value 
Cultural difference 0.003 
Competitors 0.037 
Consumer taste  0.003 
Competition 0.002 
Competition development 0.007 
Market potential  0.038 
International business relations 0.032 
Risk in ventures 0.029 
 
To test how strong this relationship is the 8 variables were subjected to a 
binominal logistic regression analysis. The data for international experience and 
CEE experience were also subjected to the regression analysis to test for 
correlation and its strength.  
 
Table 4.7 below summarises the results of the binominal logistic regression 
analysis conducted individually on the 10 variables listed. For each variable, a 
binominal logit was estimated with the dependent variable as entry mode (WOS 
or EXP).  
 
Table 4.7 Binominal logistic regression analysis, individual 
Variable   Estimate Std. 
Error 
z value P-value 
Int. experience 
Beta 0.010 0.018 0.576 0.565 
Intercept -1.93 0.516 -3.75 1.79E-04 
CEE experience 
Beta  0.196 0.061 3.22 0.001 
Intercept -4.35 0.933 -4.66 3.21E-06 
Cultural difference 
Beta  -0.798 0.231 -3.45 0.001 
Intercept -0.047 0.449 -0.106 0.916 
Competitors 
Beta  -0.471 0.161 -2.930 0.003 
Intercept -0.056 0.554 -0.101 0.919 
Consumer taste  
Beta  -1.20 0.497 -2.42 0.015 
Intercept -0.058 0.621 -0.093 0.926 
Competition 
Beta  -0.593 0.217 -2.74 0.006 
Intercept 0.460 0.774 0.594 0.552 
Competition dev. 
Beta  -0.625 0.191 -3.26 0.001 
Intercept 0.435 0.643 0.677 0.499 
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Market potential  
Beta  -0.874 0.320 -2.73 0.006 
Intercept -0.129 0.549 -0.235 0.814 
Int. business relations 
Beta  -0.502 0.297 -1.69 0.091 
Intercept -0.904 0.468 -1.93 0.053 
Risk in ventures 
Beta  -0.225 0.210 -1.08 0.282 
Intercept -1.26 0.421 -2.99 0.003 
 
The seven variables from table 4.7 with p<0.05 was then subjected to a 
binominal logistic regression analysis together to find the preferred model. The 
result of this analysis is shown in table 4.8 below.  
 
Table 4.8 Binominal logistic regression analysis, together – model 1 
Variable  Estimate Std. 
Error 
z value P-value 
Intercept 3.08 1.65 1.86 0.063 
CEE experience 0.144 0.061 2.38 0.017 
Cultural difference -0.601 0.254 -2.37 0.018 
Competitors -0.444 0.291 -1.53 0.127 
Consumer taste  -1.13 0.589 -1.92 0.055 
Competition -0.022 0.356 -0.061 0.951 
Competition dev. -0.239 0.271 -0.880 0.379 
Market potential -0.917 0.422 -2.17 0.030 
 
The Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) for the model was 116.41. The AIC is a 
tool for model selection and gives an indication of which model that describes 
the data best – the lower the AIC the better. The AIC can be used to rank the 
models but the score should not be looked at in nominal terms – e.g. rejecting a 
model because the AIC is above a certain level (Burnham and Anderson 1998). 
The variable with the highest p-value (competition) was then removed and the 
analysis was run again – see table 4.9 for the results.  
 
Table 4.9 Binominal logistic regression analysis, together – model 2 
Variable  Estimate Std. 
Error 
z value P-value 
Intercept 3.07 1.64 1.87 0.062 
CEE experience 0.144 0.060 2.38 0.017 
Cultural difference -0.599 0.250 -2.40 0.017 
Competitors -0.454 0.247 -1.83 0.067 
Consumer taste  -1.14 0.572 -2.00 0.046 
Competition dev. -0.245 0.253 -0.969 0.333 
Market potential -0.920 0.421 -2.19 0.029 
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The AIC for the model was 114.42, which indicates that the model describes the 
data better than the previous model because of the lower AIC. The variable with 
the highest p-value (competition development) was therefore removed and the 
analysis was run again. Table 4.10 shows the result of this analysis.  
 
Table 4.10 Binominal logistic regression analysis, together – model 3 
Variable  Estimate Std. 
Error 
z value P-value 
Intercept 2.46 1.49 1.65 0.099 
CEE experience 0.158 0.059 2.68 0.007 
Cultural difference -0.598 0.250 -2.39 0.016 
Competitors -0.589 0.205 -2.87 0.004 
Consumer taste  -1.09 0.563 -1.94 0.053 
Market potential -0.935 0.420 -2.22 0.026 
 
The AIC for the model was 113.36, which indicates that the model describes the 
data better than the previous model. The variable with the highest p-value 
(consumer taste) was therefore removed and the analysis was run again. Table 
4.11 shows the result of this analysis. 
 
Table 4.11 Binominal logistic regression analysis, together – model 4 
Variable  Estimate Std. 
Error 
z value P-value 
Intercept 1.54 1.26 1.22 0.223 
CEE experience 0.157 0.058 2.70 0.007 
Cultural difference -0.623 0.246 -2.54 0.011 
Competitors -0.630 0.195 -3.22 0.001 
Market potential -1.13 0.424 -2.67 0.007 
 
The AIC for the model was 117.22, which indicates that the model does not 
describe the data better than the previous model, as the AIC has increased. 
Therefore model 3 (table 4.10) is the preferred model for the data.   
 
Table 4.12 Probabilities for the preferred model (table 4.10) 
Variable  Probability 
CEE experience 16% 
Cultural difference -43% 
Competitors -43% 
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Consumer taste  -65% 
Market potential -59% 
 
Table 4.12 shows the impact that a change in a single variable has on the 
probability of a WOS entry with the other variables in the preferred model at the 
sample means (table 4.10). By increasing the CEE experience (at the variables 
means) by 1 year the probability of using a WOS entry increases by 16%. If e.g. 
the level of perceived risk in relation to cultural difference is increases by 1 (on 
the score 1-5) the probability of the firm of using a WOS entry decreases by 43%.  
 
The data was then weighted according to the 33 surveyed firms and the 
binominal logistic regression analysis was repeated for the 10 variables 
individually. The results are listed in table 4.13 below.  
 
Table 4.13 Binominal logistic regression analysis, individual, weighted 
Variable   Estimate Std. 
Error 
z value P-value 
Int. experience 
Beta  0.011 0.036 0.296 0.767 
Intercept -1.84 0.994 -1.85 0.064 
CEE experience 
Beta  0.095 0.094 1.01 0.312 
Intercept -2.71 1.29 -2.10 0.036 
Cultural difference 
Beta  -0.607 0.493 -1.23 0.218 
Intercept -0.313 1.04 -0.302 0.763 
Competitors 
Beta  -0.459 0.350 -1.31 0.190 
Intercept -0.242 1.04 -0.233 0.816 
Consumer taste  
Beta  -1.82 1.41 -1.30 0.193 
Intercept 0.791 1.66 0.477 0.633 
Competition 
Beta  -0.430 0.454 -0.948 0.343 
Intercept -0.115 1.56 -0.073 0.942 
Competition dev. 
Beta  -0.194 0.425 -0.457 0.647 
Intercept -0.908 1.53 -0.595 0.552 
Market potential  
Beta  -1.02 0.712 -1.45 0.148 
Intercept 0.249 1.21 0.205 0.838 
Int. business relations 
Beta  -0.004 0.484 -0.008 0.993 
Intercept -1.58 0.978 -1.61 0.107 
Risk in ventures 
Beta  0.177 0.394 0.448 0.654 
Intercept -1.94 0.947 -2.05 0.041 
 
As table 4.13 above shows none of the variables that showed correlation in the 
Fisher’s Exact Test have showed significant correlation in the weighted 
binominal logistic regression analysis (p<0.05).     
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5. Discussion 
The above mentioned results show a relationship between entry mode and 
perceived risk. The implications of these results are discussed below.  
 
Rejected hypotheses 
As the Fisher’s Exact Test showed no correlation between entry mode and the 
amount of similar products on the host market hypothesis H5: the greater the 
concentration (few players) of an industry, the more likely it is that firms use 
high control entry modes, cannot be verified in relation to similar products on 
the market (see below for a partly verification in relation to competitors). 
However, when analysing the data regardless of entry mode there are indications 
that Danish firms in general experience many similar products on their markets 
in CEE. This could indicate that Danish firms are not generally active within very 
tight niches in CEE but to a higher degree see opportunities in areas already 
where other firms are active. It would be interesting to investigate whether 
Danish firms in general prefer not to be first movers, or whether they are so good 
at introducing a product to a market that other firms follow. 
 
No correlation was found between either political stability or political impact 
and entry mode. Therefore it is not possible to verify hypothesis H8: the greater 
the political risk, the lesser is the likelihood that the firm will choose a full-
control mode. When looking at the data regardless of entry mode it shows a very 
clear picture. The far majority of the surveyed firms found the CEE countries to 
be very political stable and did not expect any political impact in their operations 
(95% and 87% respectively). One explanation for this could be that with the EU 
membership and especially the phase prior to membership, the CEE countries 
had to align their legislation to EU legislation, thereby adapting legislation in 
many ways quite similar to that in Denmark. However, some firms gave the 
indication they did not know much or anything about the political environment 
of the country. Their answer was solely based on their own practical experience 
in the country and very few of the firms had had any interactions with the 
political environment whatsoever. As the firms had not experienced any political 
turmoil or unrest in the country, the assumption from the surveyed firms was 
often that the country was political stable. This lack of knowledge about the 
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political environment could be part of the explanation that no correlation was 
found between entry mode and political stability. 
 
With the increased alignment with EU legislation most firms did not foresee any 
impact caused by the national or regional political environments. Some of the 
firms mentioned that the political impact they had experienced was the same for 
all their active markets within the EU and therefore there is no difference 
whether in Western or Eastern Europe. Furthermore, it has become clear that 
there is a limitation in the survey in relation to the time difference between the 
entry and an expected future political impact. This could also maybe be part of 
the explanation for the lack of correlation between entry mode and foreseeable 
political impact.  
 
The majority of the firms that met trade restrictions when they entered the CEE 
country were some of the early pioneers that entered these markets right after 
1990. All recent entries especially after the countries became EU members – 
whether WOS or EXP – indicated that they have not met any restriction. They 
find no difference compared to the EU markets in Western Europe. This could 
explain the lack of correlation: if the firms find there are no trade restrictions 
they do not or cannot act according to this. Because of the lack of correlation it 
has not been possible to verify hypothesis H9: the higher the transfer risk, the 
less likely a firm will be to choose a full-control entry mode. 
 
As the CEE countries have aligned their legislation to that of the EU, it has 
moved many of them in the direction of fewer possibilities for government 
intervention in the business environment. Such an alignment with Western (and 
Danish) business legislation probably has an impact on the level of perceived risk 
the Danish firms entering CEE have. None of the companies saw a potential risk 
in the government taking over their operations and only 11% saw a risk in 
government enforced restrictions. This can lead to the tentative conclusion that 
Danish firms entering CEE do not regard government intervention as a risk. This 
agrees with the above finding that Danish firms regard CEE as a fairly stable 
political region. Thus, the Fisher’s Exact Test showed no correlation between 
government enforced restrictions or government take-over and entry mode. It is 
therefore not possible to verify hypothesis H10: the greater the operating risk, 
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the less likely a firm will be to choose a full-control entry mode, and hypothesis 
H11: the greater the ownership risk, the less likely a firm will be to choose a full-
control entry mode. 
 
The Fisher’s Exact Test showed no correlation between entry mode and 
marketing infrastructure (the methods available to sell, distribute, advertise and 
promote a firm’s product or service). It is therefore not possible to verify 
hypothesis H13: the more different the marketing structure, the less resources 
will be committed to the market in the entry mode. The majority of the firms in 
the survey indicate the same methods were available for marketing as in 
Denmark. In the cases in which the firms did not have the same possibilities, it 
was mostly due to reported lack of technology (e.g., lower computer penetration, 
fewer consumers with internet access, etc.). Hence some marketing tools used 
successfully in Denmark were not possible to implement in the CEE country.  
  
Some firms reported they had the same possibilities but the culture for 
marketing within their industry was different than in Denmark – e.g., a higher 
use of industry magazines or local trade fairs compared to Denmark. Therefore 
they had the same possibilities, but it required a fair amount of resources to 
navigate in a partly unknown marketing environment. It would therefore be 
interesting to investigate the correlation between the differences/similarities in 
marketing behaviour and entry mode, and not focus on the possibilities for 
marketing.  
 
Most firms in the survey experienced high or very high demand for their 
products in the CEE countries. However the Fisher’s Exact Test showed no 
correlation between market demand and entry mode. It is therefore not possible 
to verify hypothesis H15: if demand in a country is low, the less likely a firm will 
be to choose a full control entry mode (see below for a partly verification in 
relation to market potential). 
 
Generally Danish firms do not regard the various risk factors described above as 
containing a level of risk that needs to be taken into consideration when entering 
a CEE market. This could be an explanation for the lack of relationship with 
entry mode choice.  
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The Fisher’s Exact Test showed no correlation between entry mode and several of 
the risk tolerance measurements. However, regardless of entry mode, Danish 
firms are generally relatively risk averse and prefer to do research before making 
a risky decision, prefer to only take risks in areas they know well and approach 
business transactions with a high degree of caution. 
 
When asked about whether the firms regarded the entry as a success or failure, 
70% of the entries were regarded as successful or very successful (answered 1 or 
2) and only 6% regarded their entry as a failure (answered 4 or 5). This falls in 
line with the result that only 1% of the firms would change their entry mode, if 
they got the chance today – even with their current level of knowledge of the 
country and market. There could be several explanations for this. First, all the 
firms really regard their chosen entry mode as the optimal. Second, there is a big 
difference between the needed resources and level of control of a wholly-owned 
subsidiary compared to an exporting mode (as described in chapter 2.1). Third, it 
is possible that the firms were not open-minded about how they regarded their 
level of success and therefore defended their initial entry mode.  
 
Accepted hypotheses 
Eight of the variables showed correlation in the Fisher’s Exact Test. When these 
and the two experience variables individually were subjected to a binominal 
logistic regression analysis, two variables did not show any significant 
correlation (p>0.05). The first of these was the international experience measure 
and it is therefore not possible to verify hypothesis H3 in relation to years of 
international experience: the greater the international experience, the greater is 
the likelihood that the firm will choose a high-control mode of entry (see below 
for a partly verification in relation to years of CEE experience). The second of the 
variables was the risk in ventures measure, indicating that there is a weak 
correlation between firm’s preference for risk in venture and entry mode.  As 
with the other risk tolerance measures, Danish firms are relative risk averse 
when it comes to risk in ventures.  
 
Below the preferred model is discussed:  
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Pr(entry mode) = f(CEE experience, cultural difference, competitors, consumer 
taste, market potential). 
 
The competition variable initially showed correlation but is not included in the 
preferred model and significant correlation can therefore not be stated based on 
the regression analysis. However, the majority of the surveyed firms found the 
competition in the CEE countries they had entered to be quite heavy. The same 
goes for the competition development variable. It also showed initial correlation 
but not significant in the preferred model, and therefore hypothesis H14: if 
competitive rivalry is high, the less likely a firm will be to choose a full control 
entry mode, cannot be verified. Regardless of entry mode, the majority of the 
firms found the level of competition to be increasing in the countries they had 
entered in CEE. As it was the case with similar products on the market, this 
could indicate that Danish firms are not operating within a niche without 
competition in CEE but in sectors with several other active players. Whether this 
is because they prefer not to be first movers on the markets or they are so good at 
introducing a product to a market that other firms follow shortly after is a topic 
for future research.  
 
In the Fisher’s Exact Test the measure for caution in international business 
relations showed correlation with entry mode. However, the measure was not 
included in the preferred model and significant correlation can therefore not be 
stated in relation to the regression analysis. Regardless of entry mode and as 
with the other risk tolerance measures, the measure showed Danish firms are 
quite risk averse when it comes to caution in international business relations.  
 
The Fisher’s Exact Test and the binomial logistic regression analysis show a 
significant and strong correlation between entry mode and years of CEE 
experience. The more years of CEE experience the more likely is the firm to 
choose a WOS entry mode.  
 
The probability of the CEE experience has been calculated to 16% (with the other 
variables at the sample means), which means that increasing the CEE experience 
by one year increases the likelihood of a WOS entry by 16%. The result shows 
that a firm with many years of CEE experience will choose a WOS entry mode. It 
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is therefore possible to partly9 verify hypothesis H3: the greater the international 
experience, the greater is the likelihood that the firm will choose a high-control 
mode of entry. One explanation for this could be that firms with great knowledge 
about CEE have a more realistic picture of the challenges the entering firm meet 
in CEE. It is therefore possible to allocate the right resources and avoid the most 
common mistakes.  
 
A careful explanation that years of CEE experience seems to have a greater 
impact on the entry mode choice than international experience could be that 
international experience is too complex an area to simplify into one measure. 
With the increased globalization of today’s business environment there might be 
a difference with regard to geographical region compared to “just” international 
markets. There might be such a difference between the various regions that 
experience gained in one region is less useful in another region. 
 
The analysis also showed a strong correlation between entry mode and cultural 
difference. The correlation shows that the lower the cultural difference the more 
likely the firm is to choose a WOS entry mode. The probability has been 
calculated at -43% (with the other variables at the sample means), which means 
that increasing the chosen response by 1 (e.g. from 3 to 4) the likelihood of 
choosing a WOS entry decrease with 43%. It is therefore possible to verify 
hypothesis H4; the greater the cultural difference between the home country and 
the host country, the lesser is the likelihood that the firm will choose a full-
control mode. A reason for this correlation could be that if firms find the country 
to be culturally quite similar to Denmark they feel they have a better 
understanding of the country and are therefore willing to allocate more resources 
and want more control in relation to their entry.  
 
It is important to notice that the verification of the hypotheses is under the 
assumption that the entries are independent observations and weighting the data 
is therefore not needed. The binominal logistic regression analysis of the 
weighted data (table 4.13) showed no significant correlation between entry mode 
and either of the variables. However, the variables with the lowest p-values in 
                                                        
9 The hypothesis can only be verified partly as the measure international experience did not 
show any significant correlation.  
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the weighted analysis are the same as the ones in the preferred model, which 
indicates results pointing in the same direction.  
 
The third of the variables in the preferred model to show significant correlation 
with entry mode was competitors (the number of competitors in the specific CEE 
country). With a probability of -43%10 (with the other variables at the sample 
means) the results indicate that the lower the number of competitors in a CEE 
country the more likely it is the firm will choose a WOS entry. It is therefore 
possible to partly11 verify hypothesis H5; the greater the concentration (few 
players) of an industry, the more likely it is that firms use high control entry 
modes. If the firm only has one or two main competitors in the country, it is 
most likely competitors they know from other markets and therefore the 
unknown factors are minimal. On the other hand, if there is a huge amount of 
competitors the uncertainties are greater and the firm may not wish to allocate 
the resources or want the control necessary for a WOS entry.  
 
The fourth variable in the preferred model to show correlation with entry mode 
was consumer taste. With a probability of -65% (with the other variables as the 
sample means) the results shows that the more different the consumer taste in 
CEE, the less likely it is the firm will choose a WOS entry. It is therefore possible 
to verify hypothesis H12: the more different the consumer taste, the lesser 
resources will be committed to the market in the entry mode.  
  
The vast majority of the firms interviewed found the difference in consumer taste 
would decrease even more in the future. However, there were suggestions in the 
interviews of a difference between firms selling to business segment (B2B) and 
firms selling to the consumer segment (B2C). For B2B firms the difference in 
consumer taste seemed to be smaller than for B2B firms. There could be various 
explanations for this. One could be that the B2B firms of the host country to a 
larger degree is active in an international business environment, where local 
culture might not be so distinctive and it could be the case with B2C segment. 
This is an area that would be interesting to explore more into details in future 
research.  
                                                        
10 Exactly the same as cultural difference. 
11 It is only possible to verify the hypothesis partly because the measure similar products on the 
market also was part of this hypothesis and did not show any correlation. 
 71 
 
The fifth and final variable in the preferred model which has shown correlation 
with entry mode is market potential. The probability for market potential has 
been calculated at -59% (with the other variables at the sample means), which 
means that increasing the chosen response by 1 (e.g. from 3 to 4) the likelihood 
of choosing a WOS entry decreases by 59%. It is therefore possible to partly12 
verify hypothesis H15; if demand in a country is low, a firm will perceive high 
market complexity risk. An explanation for this correlation could be that firms 
who see a good future market potential are not motivated to share the possible 
profit with a local partner. With a solid market potential there is also room for 
the firm to make mistakes without then resulting in complete failure in the 
market. Furthermore, with a good market potential the firm is probably also 
willing to invest more resources as the future prospects are good. 
 
In the special case of Danish firms entering CEE it is possible to verify the 
control risk hypotheses: H6: in markets where control risks are low, firms will 
select entry mode strategies in which they can maintain control over the 
operation, and H7: in host countries where control risks are high, firms will 
choose entry mode strategies which shift risks and control to other firms. 
Furthermore, the market complexity risk hypothesis H16 can be verified either: 
in countries where market complexity risk is perceived as being high, firms will 
select strategies that shift the risks to third parties.  
 
  
                                                        
12 It is only possible to verify the hypothesis partly because the measure of market demand also 
was part of this hypothesis and did not show any correlation. 
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Figure 4 below summarizes findings.  
 
Figure 4: Risk variables affecting entry mode choice 
 
 
 
  
Total perceived 
international risk  
 
Control risk  
1. Management experience 
2. Cultural difference 
3. Industry structure  
 
Market complexity risk  
1. Political risk  
2. Transfer risk 
3. Operating risk  
4. Ownership risk  
5. Marketing infrastructure  
6. Consumer taste  
7. Market demand 
8. Competitive rivalry 
 
Entry mode strategy 
 
1. Exporting (non-
equity) 
 
2. Joint venture (equity) 
 
3. Wholly owned 
subsidiary 
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6. Conclusion  
6.1 Summary 
The literature review described the research in the fields of entry mode, risk, 
characteristics of CEE and finally risk tolerance. In the review it was found that 
entry mode choice is a question of wish for control and resource allocation. The 
various entry mode choices were divided into 3 groups: exporting (non-equity), 
joint venture (equity) and wholly owned subsidiary.  
 
The existing literature on risk describes many different risk variables, but based 
partly on the work of Brouthers and Ahmed, a risk-entry mode framework was 
described. A risk tolerance measure was added to the model in order to 
investigate a possible connection between entry mode choice and risk tolerance. 
Finally, the transition of the CEE countries from plan economies to more open 
market economies and members of the EU was described.  
 
A random sample of Danish firms with activities in CEE was then selected among 
the members of DI. They were given a questionnaire. This gave a survey with a 
response rate of 67%. Thirty-three firms participated in the survey and they had 
170 useful entries into CEE between them. The responses were then analysed 
using a Fisher’s Exact Test and a binominal logistic regression analysis. The 
results were then presented and discussed. Below is outlined the main results of 
the research.  
 
The preferred model is a probabilistic model that links the probability of entry 
mode choice with 5 risk variables (two control risk variables and three market 
complexity risk variables):  
 
Pr(entry mode) = f(CEE experience, cultural difference, competitors, consumer 
taste, market potential) 
 
The preferred model showed the various perceived risk variables have influence 
on the entry mode decision of the firm. First, the model showed a very strong 
correlation between years of CEE experience and entry mode choice. The more 
years of CEE experience the more likely the firm is to choose a WOS entry. 
Second, the preferred model showed a strong correlation between entry mode 
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and cultural difference. The smaller the cultural difference between Denmark 
and the respective CEE country the more likely it is that the firm will choose a 
WOS entry. Third, the model showed a significant correlation between the 
number of competitors in a CEE country and the entry mode choice. The more 
competitors in a CEE country the less likely it is the firm will choose a WOS 
entry. Fourth, the model showed a significant correlation between consumer 
taste and entry mode. Fifth and finally, the preferred model showed a clear 
correlation between future market potential and entry mode choice. The more 
promising the market potential, the more likely it is the firm will choose a WOS 
entry.   
 
Regardless of entry mode choice the thesis also showed some relative clear 
results. Danish firms regard CEE as political stable and do not fear any political 
impact on their activities. In addition, they do not see a potential risk in the local 
CEE government taking over their operations and they do not see a risk in 
relation to government enforced restrictions. Danish firms experience relatively 
high and increasing competition and quite many similar products on the CEE 
markets. The majority of the surveyed firms indicate the same methods are 
available for marketing in CEE as in Denmark. 
 
There several indications that the CEE markets in which Danish firms are active 
have relative high competition. First of all, the majority of the firms report high 
levels of competition. Further, the majority also see this competition as 
increasing and they experience many similar products on the markets. This could 
indicate that Danish firms are primarily active within non-niche sectors in CEE. 
 
In the special case of Danish firms entering CEE the analytical results tend to 
support the findings of other researchers (Brouthers et al. 1996, Miller 1992, 
Werner et al. 1996) that firms must consider multiple measures of risk in making 
their entry mode decision. As described above, the reason for this is that risk is a 
multifaceted measure and some risk measurements seems to interact with each 
other.  
 
The analysis of the data of the risk tolerance measures shows a clear indication 
that Danish firms are predominately risk averse and take a cautions and 
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measured approach to risk. Furthermore, risk tolerance seems to a certain 
degree to have an impact on entry mode.  
 
Because both risks within the control risk variables and market complexity risk 
variables showed to have influence on entry mode choice, it is possible to verify 
the two main hypotheses in the special case of Danish firms’ entries into CEE: 
H1: In countries where risk is low, firms will select entry strategies in which they 
can maintain control over the operation, and H2: In countries where risk is high, 
firms will select entry strategies which shift risks and control to other firms. 
 
As stated earlier, selecting the right entry mode for an international market is 
one of the most critical managerial decisions and affects the long-term success of 
a firm. Furthermore, managing risk is one of the major strategic objectives for 
managers of multinational firms. Firms choosing a strategy which incorporates 
international risk perform better than firms that do not take risk into 
consideration. The results of this research should therefore be taken into 
considerations in the special case of Danish firms entering CEE.  
 
6.2 Practical implications 
From the results mentioned above several policy recommendations can be made. 
If policy makers sought to increase Danish trade and engagement with the CEE 
countries in EU, there are several results that could be relevant to take into 
consideration. As the analysis showed, the majority of the surveyed firms had a 
more than 50 employees and 40% had more than 100 employees, where only 
1.2% of Danish firms in general have more than 100 employees. This could 
indicate that any policy initiatives should be targeted towards firms with more 
than 50 employees, preferably more than 100 employees. 
 
Secondly, it would be wise to target firms with many years of CEE experience as 
they are more likely to allocate more resources and wanting more control – WOS 
entry. CEE countries with a low cultural difference compared to Denmark should 
have main priority, as should countries with few competitors and a solid market 
potential. 
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From a policy design point of view, it is wise to take the following results into 
consideration. Danish firms regard CEE as political stable and do not fear any 
government intervention. Danish firms experience relatively high and increasing 
competition in CEE, however, the same methods are available for marketing in 
CEE as in Denmark.  
 
As stated above all firms in the survey were successful. In markets with similar 
culture and consumer taste to Denmark, few competitors and a good market 
potential, firms should therefore consider choosing a WOS entry mode. If these 
conditions are not present it would be advisable for firms to choose and EXP 
entry mode.  Furthermore, firms with many years of CEE experience should 
consider a WOS entry. If they do not have this experience, they should consider 
hiring a manager with extensive CEE experience to ensure a successful entry into 
CEE.  
 
Firms are generally satisfied with the entry mode they have chosen, so instead of 
promoting a specific entry mode, the Danish or CEE government should work 
with the firms based on their chosen entry mode.  
 
6.3 Limitations 
There could be a confounding issue as the firms have been asked about an entry 
that took place up to 18 years ago and some of the risk perceptions are linked to 
a current situation. For example the firms are asked whether they foresee any 
impact on their operations caused by the political environment (a future risk) 
and at the same time they are asked whether they were met by any trade 
restrictions when they entered the host country (a present risk). These are two 
events at two different times. In future research, there should be a closer link 
(shorter period of time) between the entry and the perceptions. The firms could 
for example be asked about their most recent entry and perceptions in relation to  
it, or research could focus only on entries that were not more than a couple of 
years old. This would ensure there was closest possible link between the entry 
and the perceptions. However, this would require a much higher number of 
interviews, which is outside the scope of this thesis. To examine how and why 
these risk perceptions and entry modes evolve and change over time long-term 
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research is needed, whereas this survey more was a single snapshot of a 
situation.  
 
As described, 70% of the firms in the survey regarded their entry as successful 
and only 1% of the firms would change their entry mode, if they got the chance. 
This could suggest that the firms were not that open-minded about how they 
regarded their level of success and therefore chose to stick with their initial entry 
mode. It could be interesting for future research to look more into depth whether 
there is a correlation between the perceived level of success of a firm’s entry 
mode into a market and its willingness to change this entry mode if a specific 
level of success is not reached. 
 
An issue for discussion is which approach should be taken in relation to the 
binominal logistic regression analysis – whether the data should be weighted or 
not. In some cases the non-weighted data showed a correlation between entry 
mode and a particular perceived risk, whereas as soon as the data was weighted 
this correlation was lost. This could indicate that there might be a possibility that 
this correlation would be more obvious if the number of surveyed firms was 
increased. It could indicate that the experience of a few firms with many entries 
are driving these findings. It is difficult to be concrete about the weighting but it 
opens up a further area of study. 
 
The low sample size is clearly a limitation for the study. It is not possible to 
comment on sectors, firm size or any other characteristics of the firms due to the 
low amount of firms surveyed. It would be advisable to increase the number of 
surveyed firms in future research or focus on e.g. a specific sector.  
 
As stated above, there is an indication that Danish firms are primarily active 
within non-niche sectors in CEE. Whether this is because Danish firms in 
general prefer not to be first movers or they are so good at introducing a product 
to a market that other firms follow shortly after could be interesting to 
investigate further. Furthermore, the analysis showed quite clearly that Danish 
firms are relative risk averse. A suggestion for future research could be to 
identify the reasons for this and also the level of risk tolerance compared to firms 
from other countries. 
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In some cases the Danish firms had the same marketing possibilities as they had 
in Denmark, but due to a different marketing culture it required a fair amount of 
resources to navigate in a partly unknown marketing environment. A topic for 
future research could therefore be to investigate the correlation between the 
difference/similarities in marketing behaviour and entry mode, and not 
focussing on the possibilities for marketing. 
 
The limitations have directed the research as only successful firms whose entries 
have survived are included in the survey.  Furthermore, the low sample size has 
made it impossible to investigate e.g. sector characteristics.  
 
6.4 Contributions 
First of all, only a few studies have examined international risk as a whole, even 
fewer have examined the relationship between integrated risk and entry mode 
decision. This study showed a clear relationship between integrated risk and 
entry mode choice.  
 
Second, it seems to be the first empirical study of perceived risk and entry modes 
among Danish firms and especially in relation to CEE. Due to the special case of 
Danish firms’ entry into CEE it was possible to accept the two main hypotheses.   
 
Third, no known research has included risk tolerance in relation to entry mode 
research and especially not for Danish firms. The study showed no clear 
relationship between risk tolerance and entry mode, but found that Danish firms 
are clearly risk averse. 
7.1 Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
 
Company:________________________________   CVR no:______________  Number of employees:_____________ 
 
Interviewee:____________________________________  Phone:_______________________ 
 
No. Risk Country       
1 - Entry mode  
(WOS:1, JV:2, EXP:3) 
     
2 MaEx How many years of international experience do your firm has?  
(Years) 
     
3 MaEx How many years of international experience with CEE do your firm has?  
(Years) 
     
4 CulDif Do you find the culture in the country to be different from the one in Denmark?   
(1): very similar to Denmark, (5): very different from Denmark 
     
5 IndStr How many competitors do you have in this country?  
(1): one or two main competitors, (5): many competitors 
     
6 IndStr Are there many products/services similar to yours in the market?  
(1) unique product/service, (5): many similar products/services 
     
7 PolRis How would you rate the political stability in this country?  
(1): highly stable, (5): highly unstable 
     
8 PolRis Do you foresee any impact on your operations caused by the political environment?   
(1): no impact, (5): high impact 
     
9 TraRis When you entered the country, did you meet any restrictions in relation to bringing goods, 
services and funds in and out of the country?  
(1): unrestricted, (5): highly restricted. 
     
10 OptRis How likely do you find it, that government enforced restrictions will affect you business in the 
country? (1): very unlikely, (5): very likely 
     
11 OwnRis What do you think is the risk of the government taking over your firm's operations in this 
country? (1): very unlikely, (5): very likely 
     
12 ConTas How do you find the taste of the consumers in the country compared to Denmark?  (1): very 
similar to Denmark, (5): very different from Denmark 
     
13 MarInf Do you find the methods available to sell, distribute, advertise and promote your      
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product/service similar or different from Denmark?  
(1): very similar to Denmark, (5): very different from Denmark 
14 ComRiv How do you find the competition in the market?  
(1): almost non-existing, (5): very fierce 
     
15 ComRiv How do you find the development in the competition?  
(1): declining, (5): increasing 
     
16 MarDe What do you think is the current market demand for your products in this country? (1): high 
demand, (5): low demand 
     
17 MarDe What do you think is the future market potential for you products in this country?  
(1): high potential, (5): low potential 
     
18 - Do you regard your entry as a success?  
(1): Success, (5): Failure  
     
19 - With the knowledge you have today, would you enter this country differently?  
(WOS:1, JV:2, EXP:3) 
     
20 RiskTol Your firm prefers certainty in its international business relationships, even if this could involve 
a lower level of business performance?  
(1): strongly agree, (5): strongly disagree 
     
21 RiskTol Research is important before making a risky decision?  
(1): strongly agree, (5): strongly disagree 
     
22 RiskTol Your business only takes risks in areas it knows well? 
(1): strongly agree, (5): strongly disagree 
     
23 RiskTol Your firm approaches business transactions with a high degree of caution? 
(1): strongly agree, (5): strongly disagree 
     
24 RiskTol Your firm prefers to participate in low-risk low pay-off ventures rather than high-risk high pay-
off ventures?  
(1): strongly agree, (5): strongly disagree 
     
Country codes: ES: Estonia, LA: Latvia, LT: Lithuania, PL: Poland, SLK: Slovakia, SLO: Slovenia, CZ: Czech Republic, HU: Hungary, BUL: Bulgaria, and RU: Rumania.  
 
Notes:  
 
 
7.2 Appendix 2: Possibility of WOS in CEE 
 
Bulgaria 
According to the Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency it has been possible for 
foreign firm to own subsidiaries in Bulgaria since January 1 1992. 
 
Czech Republic and Slovakia 
January 1 1993 was Czechoslovakia peacefully divided into the two independent 
countries Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Jozef Marusik from the Slovak 
Investment and Trade Development Agency informs that from January 1 1991 it 
was possible for foreign firms to have full ownership rights. This law was after 
January 1 1993 adopted by both countries.  
 
Estonia  
According to Margu Mihkelsoo from Invest in Estonia it has been possible for 
foreign firm to own subsidiaries in Estonia since January 1 1992.  
 
Hungary 
According to the Hungarian Investment and Trade Development Agency full 
ownership of a local firm has been possible since 1990.  
 
Latvia  
Investment and Development Agency of Latvia informs that foreign firms have 
had full ownership rights in Latvia since 1990 – “According to the Law of the 
Republic of Latvia, adopted on 26 September 1990 „Foreign (enterprise) 
company subsidiary office and representations in the Republic of Latvia and 
subsidiary offices  and representations of enterprises of the Republic of Latvia 
abroad may have legal person status, if the laws of this countries foresee 
subsidiary offices or representations of those status” 
 
Lithuania 
Audrius Masiulionis from Lietuvos Ekonomines Pletros Agenturain (Lithuanian 
Development Agency) informs that full foreign ownership of firms in Lithuania 
has been possible since 1991.  
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Poland 
Marek Szostak from Foreign Investment Department, Polish Information and 
Foreign Investment Agency informs that full foreign ownership has been possible 
in Poland since 1991. “Polish transformation after 1989 has created the 
possibility to foreign companies to enter Polish market in a bigger scale that it 
was possible during the communist regime. The possibility to buy Polish 
company by a foreign one arise since coming into force the Law from June 14, 
1991 on companies with foreign share. Article 1 of mentioned law has created the 
freedom to undertake the business activity in Poland by foreign enterprises”.  
 
Romania  
Before 1990 foreign participation in joint ventures in Romania could not exceed 
more than 49 % according to Decree 424 from November 2 1972. According to 
article 2 from Decree 96 from March 14 1990 the legal possibility for setting up 
companies with full foreign ownership was introduced in order to attract foreign 
investments to Romania. Source: Romanian Agency for Foreign Investment, 
Secretary General Raluca Gheorghe-Anghel. 
 
Slovenia  
According to Matej Skocir from Public Agency of Republic of Slovenia for 
Entrepreneurship and Foreign Investments it has been possible for a foreign 
firm to have full ownership of a local firm since 1991 – a law that has been 
adjusted in 1993 and again in 1999.   
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